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WORLD BANK,  AND  BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY, 
AND  WORLD BANK 
Can  Communist  Economies 
Transform  Incrementally? 
The  Experience  of  China* 
1. Some  Important  Questions  Raised  by China's  Reforms 
Reform  of  a  communist  economy  entails  shifting  away  from  central 
planning  toward  largely  market-based  resource  allocation.  It also  in- 
volves  strengthening  incentives  that link material reward  to economic 
performance  by moving  toward private ownership  and reforming man- 
agement  incentives  within  systems  that maintain extensive  social own- 
ership.  Reform may  also  involve  a political  transition  to pluralism  but 
not necessarily. 
Since  1978 China has progressively  introduced  market forces,  decen- 
tralized  economic  decision  making,  and  strengthened  material incen- 
tives  and  competition.  In  almost  all  respects,  its  transformation  has 
differed  from the  swift,  comprehensive,  and  fundamental  pattern that 
has  been  widely  advocated  for  Eastern  Europe  (EE) and  the  former 
Soviet  Union  (FSU). China's reforms have often been  introduced  on an 
experimental  basis,  and  are sectorally  and  locally  differentiated.  They 
are still incomplete-in  redefining  property rights,  marketization,  liber- 
alizing  foreign  transactions  and factor markets.  Rather than attempting 
to "cross a chasm  in one  leap,"  China has  negotiated  a series  of small 
*The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors  and not necessarily  those of 
the World Bank. We are indebted to Dilip Ratha  for excellent assistance and to Stanley 
Fischer,  Dilip Ratha,  Tom Rawski,  Klaus  Schmidt-Hebbel,  and Martin  Schrenk  for helpful 
comments. All shortcomings  of the paper are the responsibility  of the authors. 88 *  GELB,  JEFFERSON,  & SINGH 
steps,  moving  from  planned  toward  market  socialism  while  retaining 
an authoritarian communist  government. 
The outcome  of China's reforms has also been very different from the 
experience  of Eastern  Europe  and  the  FSU.  Rather than  the  lackluster 
performance  of  European  reform  socialism  through  the  1980s  or  the 
precipitous  fall  in  output  that  accompanied  radical  reform  programs 
after 1990, China doubled  per capita income in one decade,  an outstand- 
ing  achievement  even  when  compared  with  other  high-performing 
countries.1  How  does  this  "East Asian"  response  to incrementally  re- 
moving  constraints  on market behavior  square with  the opposing  "big- 
bang"  thesis  that  partial  reform  is  probably  worse  than  no  reform, 
because  it leaves  economic  agents  constrained  neither  by  plan  nor by 
markets? Is transition  economics  schizophrenic?2  Or are there  rational 
bases  for such  widely  differing  views?  If so,  what  is transferable from 
China? 
China's reform experience  therefore raises some important questions. 
What does  it suggest  regarding: 
1.  fast versus  slow  liberalization  and opening  up of the economy; 
2.  comprehensive  top-down  versus  experimental  bottom-up  reforms; 
3.  the need  to establish  full private property  rights at the beginning  of 
reform; 
4.  the implications  of reforms for welfare  and distribution? 
5.  Is  China's  performance  sustainable  without  more  comprehensive 
transformation?  Or does  it reflect  transient  gains  that are substan- 
tially exhausted? 
6.  How  transferable  are  any  lessons  from  China-and  what  does  it 
suggest  about  the  phasing  of  political  and  economic  liberalization 
and the pattern of reform? 
This  paper  surveys  China's  reforms  and  their  economic  impact 
against  the  backdrop  of  the  wider  debate  on  these  topics.  Section  II 
classifies  China's  reforms  by  period  and by type  of reform.  Section  III 
assesses  China's  macroeconomic  and  social  indicators  of  performance 
in  an international  context,  with  selected  East Asian  market countries 
and socialist countries taken as benchmarks to see where  China's perfor- 
mance  stands  out as exceptional.  It also notes  the possible  importance 
of demographic  factors in performance.  Section IV deepens  the analysis 
of  extensive  versus  intensive  growth  (accumulation  versus  productiv- 
1. For some  comparisons,  see  World Bank (1991), pp.  11-12. 
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ity),  summarizing  quantitative  evidence  from recent firm-level  studies, 
and  evaluating  the  changing  incentive  structures  in the  Chinese  econ- 
omy  that  would  be  needed  to link  policies  to performance.  Section  V 
summarizes  recent  research  on  the  relationship  between  reforms,  in- 
come distribution,  and poverty  in China. Section VI considers  the impli- 
cations  of  partial  reforms  for  macroeconomic  stability  and  the 
sustainability  of China's  economic  performance.  Section  VII concludes 
on lessons  from China and their transferability to other reforming social- 
ist countries. 
1.2 DATA CAVEAT 
Unlike  the historical data for some  other communist  countries,  Chinese 
output estimates  are believed  to be generally free from deliberate overre- 
porting.  But statistical weaknesses  introduce  biases  in reported income 
and output  levels  and  possibly  in derived  rates of growth.  Corrections 
plausibly  result  in  much  higher  nominal  and  real output  and  income 
levels,  and they  also affect estimates  of income  distribution.  The direc- 
tion of bias is not always  clear. This paper cannot attempt to correct for 
such  weaknesses,  but,  where  appropriate,  it notes  the  implications  of 
major revisions.3 
2. China's  Reforms  After  1978 
China's  reforms  followed  almost  three decades  of central planning  un- 
der a communist  government.  In that time,  the economy  had  evolved 
from an essentially  peasant  base to include  significant  industrial capac- 
ity,  largely  financed  out of the  rural surplus.  By 1952 land reform had 
been  completed;  in  1953 compulsory  grain  procurement  and  food  ra- 
tioning  were  introduced.  Collectivization  followed  in  1956-1958.  By 
1978 industry  accounted  for 49% of national income.  Following  the So- 
viet  pattern,  large  state  enterprises  (SOEs)  (78% of  output)  in  heavy 
sectors  (57% of output)  were  emphasized.  Growth  was  extensive,  and 
particularly disappointing  in agriculture. Moreover,  such leftist excesses 
3. Problem areas in Chinese data include low imputed rents and capital incomes, the 
valuation of self-consumption, the construction  of deflators, especially in some areas 
of industry, and the agricultural  labor force. For discussion of the major  controversy 
regarding  the level and growth rates  of China's  GDP, see Keidel  (1992),  Ma  and Garnaut 
(1992),  and Jefferson  (1991).  The latter  notes that the World  Bank's  World  Development 
Reports  estimate China's GNP per head at $350 at the end of the 1980s,  which is lower 
than the estimates of $410 and $390 in 1976  and 1977 (made in 1978  and 1979)  despite 
real growth rates of output per head of almost 8%  in the 1978-1988.  Keidel suggests a 
revaluation  of 50%  to China's  yuan GDP;  meanwhile, PPP  estimates  of China's  income/ 
head range from three to eight times those of exchange-rate  based measures. 90 - GELB, JEFFERSON, & SINGH 
as  the  Great  Leap  Forward  (1958-1961)  and  the  Cultural  Revolution 
(1965-1968)  caused  erratic  economic  performance  and  demographic 
changes  (see  Fig. 1). 
Nevertheless,  the prereform period achieved  some  notable successes. 
Infrastructure had been  developed,  particularly in rural areas. A work- 
ing  rural management  system  supporting  supply  and  marketing  had 
been  put  in place.  The substantial  role played  by local governments  in 
planning  meant  that local implementation  capacity was  well  developed 
and  also  implied  a less  monopolistic  production  structure.4 There was 
a heavy  industrial  base  on  which  to  build.  Social  indicators  in  areas 
such as health and education  were favorable, especially  considering  the 
low  level  of income  per head.  Following  an extraordinary demographic 
transition in the 1970s (see Fig. 1), China was  on the way  to having  one 
of the lowest  ratio of dependents  to working-age  citizens  in the world.5 
External macroeconomic  balance  prevailed  (international  reserves  of $4 
billion exceeded  the negligible  foreign debt), and, despite  price controls, 
it does  not  appear  that a sizeable  monetary  overhang  had  developed. 
The missing  elements  were  an appropriate price structure to guide  effi- 
cient  resource  allocation  and  an  effective  incentive  system  to  create 
strong  growth  performance. 
China's  reforms  can be considered  in seven  categories  and four time 
phases,  as shown  in Table 1. The first three categories-price  and mar- 
ket reform, the "open-door  policy,"  and liberalization of the distribution 
system-involve  the creation of a market price-guided  incentive  system 
to supplement  and  replace planned  allocation  of goods.  The next cate- 
gory  involves  changes  in  property  rights,  broadly  defined  to  include 
the management,  as well  as ownership,  of assets.  Accompanying  these 
reforms are measures  to decentralize  resource allocation away from the 
center,  and  to create a market-supporting  financial  sector.  Finally,  the 
shift  from a planned  to a market economy  involves  policy  changes  to 
separate out the productive  side of the economy  (which should  respond 
to market forces) from the state's  role in the area of social protection. 
No grand scheme  underlay China's sequence  of measures.  Some were 
experimental,  sanctioned  by the center only after successful  local imple- 
mentation.  Although  the  rural reforms had  somewhat  of a "big-bang" 
character,  urban  and  industrial  reforms  were  gradual  and  piecemeal.6 
4. This  probably  facilitated  a competitive  response  to  price liberalization  relative  to  the 
situation,  e.g.,  in the FSU. For more discussion  of China's initial conditions,  see Harrold 
(1992). 
5. For discussion  of China's  demographics  and policies,  see Tien et al. (1992). 
6. The rural reforms still relied on quotas and state prices for intramarginal production and 
management  incentives  through  contracting  and  leasing,  rather than outright  private 
ownership.  In this sense,  they  were  piecemeal  and somewhat  less  than a "big bang." Can Communist Economies  Transform  Incrementally?  The Experience  of China  91 
Figure 1 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND  DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 
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Source:  China Statistical  Year  Book  and World  Bank. Table  1  KEY  CHINA  REFORM 
Reform  Phase I: 1984-1988  Phase II: 1989-1990  Phase III: 1989-1990  Phase IV: 1991 
Price and market  1978-1979  22% rise in ag- 
ricultural procurement 
prices; 41% rise in 
prices for above-quota 
agricultural outputs 
1979 Experimental  intro- 
duction  of "guidance 
prices" for above-quota 
industrial  output 
1988-1989  Temporary  re-  1990-1992  Relaxation  of 
imposition  of controls  temporary  controls  on 
on prices  and  internal  prices  and  trade 
trade during  stabili- 
zation 
1988-1992  Raise plan prices  towards  market prices,  so 
merging  the dual  price system;  1991-1992  grain  and 
offseeds  price reform,  to convert  agricultural prod- 
uct subsidies  into wages 
Key agricultural inputs  still controlled 
1984 Formal introduction 
of 2-tier pricing system 
for industry,  lift guid- 
ance  price ceilings;  re- 
move  them  in 1985 
1985-1988  Progressively 
enlarge  market price 
role for industry 
1985-1987  Relaxation  of 
mandatory  production 
plans  in agriculture  in 
favor of purchasing  con- 
tracts, which  allowed 
output  diversification; 
progressive  relaxation 
of restrictions  on inter- 
regional  and interna- 
tional  trade in agricul- 
tural products Foreign  trade, 
exchange,  and 
investment 
1979 Joint Venture  Law 
passed 
1980 Opening  of first 4 
Special  Economic 
Zones:  the first indus- 
trial reform 
1986 Remaining  controls 
on  prices of most  con- 
sumer  goods  decentral- 
ized  to local govern- 
ments;  decontrol  ac- 
cording  to local condi- 
tions 
1986 Sino-British Accord 
on Hong  Kong 
1988-1992  Foreign  exchange  trading centers  estab- 
lished  and  opened  to all enterprises  for buying  and 
selling  at floating  rates (by 1991, a third of transac- 
tions  at floating  rates) 
1985 Removal  of prohibi-  Reduction  of black market 
tion on creating foreign  1991 from 100% in previ, 
trade corporations  (by 
1990, 6,000 created) 
1985 Reduction  in scope 
of the trade plan; 1987 
exemption  of certain 
sectors  from trade plan, 
sharing  of foreign  ex- 
change  between  central 
and local governments; 
1988 Trade contracting 
system 
Agricultural  trade administered  to tax producers  (rice) 
and  subsidize  consumers  (wheat) 
premium  to only  6% by 
ous years 
1991 Elimination  of cen- 
tral export  subsidies,  in- 
creased  local  retention 
of foreign  exchange; 
China applies  for GATT 
membership;  trade re- 
form accelerates 
Real devaluation  of Yuan 
Materials  supply  and  Reduce  scope  of Materials  Distribution  System;  1978 cut number  of category  I and  II goods  (producer  and  in- 
distribution  vestment  goods)  from  210 to 64 and  to 20 by  1992; phase  out  control over  category  III goods  (inputs  for con- 
sumer  products);  establish  485 trade centers  for industrial  materials  by  1985 
1987 onwards,  introduce  industrial  commodity  markets 
Reform Commercial  System;  deregulate  entry/exit  (between  1978 and  1990 10 million  private  firms,  450,000  co- 
operatives  and 3,400  JVs enter  the commercial  system):  by  1985 75% of state commercial  and  service  compa- 
nies  sold  or leased  to private  owners Table 1  KEY CHINA  REFORM (continued) 
Reform  Phase I: 1984-1988  Phase II: 1989-1990  Phase III: 1989-1990  Phase IV: 1991 
1980 State enterprises  al- 
lowed  to buy  and  sell 
on  free markets 
1978-1979  Experimental 
introduction  of con- 
tracting land  use  and 
for outputs  to house- 
holds 
1981 Official recognition 
of Household  Responsi- 
bility System  (already 
adopted  by 45% of pro- 
duction  teams,  98% 
adoption  by  1988),  pro- 
gressive  lengthening  of 
lease  term,  from  1-3  to 
15 years,  distribution  ac- 
cording  to family  size 
1984 State enterprise  per- 
mitted  to market di- 
rectly 
1984 Central Bank estab- 
lished  to create a 2-tier 
system  5 
1987 two  new  universal 
banks  created 
1988 Transfer of land  use 
rights legalized  (al- 
though  mechanisms  to 
facilitate a land  market 
came  only  in  1990, and 
this market is not opera- 
tive yet) 
1987 Adoption  of Con- 
tract Management  Re- 
sponsibility  System  for 
industry,  3-5  year 
targets 
1987 Bankruptcy  Law 
passed 
1989-1992  Stock markets created,  first for secondary 
trading  of government  bonds  and  then  for shares 
(Shanghai,  1990; Shenzen,  1991) 
1992 New  Operating 
Mechanism  increases 
autonomy  of state enter- 
prises 
Financial sector 
Ownership  and 
management Fiscal 
decentralization 
1984 Permission  granted 
for local governments 
to establish  industrial 
enterprises  (TVEs) 
1988 Enterprise  Law 
Progressive  diversification  of industrial  ownership  toward  nonstate  sector 
1988-1989  Temporary  1991 3,000  inefficient  state 
retrenchment  of enter-  enterprises  merged 
prise  reform,  measures  with  others;  direct 
to reduce  investment  at  credit restraints  eased, 
all levels  reversion  to enterprise 
reform 
1984 Tax reform creates  4 
new  indirect  taxes in- 
cluding  VAT 
1984-1985  Reform of en- 
terprise taxation: profit 
remittance  to state re- 
placed  by partial taxa- 
tion  (at negotiated 
rates) of profits with  de- 
preciation  and  post-tax 
profits  retained  by en- 
terprises 
1986 Central government 
enters  into  "fiscal con- 
tract responsibility  sys- 
tem" with  local 
governments 96 *  GELB,  JEFFERSON,  & SINGH 
The  discrete  reform  stages  therefore,  are,  necessarily  somewhat  of an 
abstraction. 
2.1 PHASE  I: 1978-1983 
This emphasized  agriculture.  Procurement  prices for major crops were 
raised  sharply  and  prices  for above-quota  output  raised  more  sharply 
still. Subsidies  were increased  to help cushion  the impact on consumers. 
The  contracting  of  land  and  output  quotas  to  rural households  pro- 
ceeded  rapidly  on local initiative; by the time this  "bottom-up"  experi- 
ment  was  officially  sanctioned  in  1981, it had  been  adopted  by almost 
half  of  the  country's  production  teams.  Household  contracting  soon 
became  universal  and lease  terms lengthened,  promoting  long-term  in- 
vestments. 
The  first industrial  reforms  came  in  the  area of foreign  investment. 
The year  1979 saw  a Joint Venture  Law and  1980 the  opening  of four 
special  economic  zones.  From  almost  zero,  foreign  direct  investment 
would  rise to exceed  $3 billion per year, mostly  from Hong Kong. Phase 
I also saw the start of wide-ranging  changes  in the distribution  systems 
that  proceeded  throughout  the  reform  period.  Materials  supply  was 
progressively  delinked  from the plan, while  retail commerce  was dereg- 
ulated more rapidly. After some informal sales of above-quota  industrial 
goods  at premium  prices,  state enterprises  were allowed  to buy and sell 
on  free  markets.  Meanwhile,  certain  key  inputs  remained  controlled, 
particularly in rural areas. 
2.2 PHASE  II: 1984-1988 
This  saw  the  consolidation  of  a  formal  dual  pricing  system  and  the 
progressive  enlargement  of the role of free prices (see Fig. 2). The dual 
pricing  system  aimed  to  have  marginal  decisions  set  by  market  pres- 
sures  while  still leaving  a measure  of control over materials and enter- 
prise  profitability  to  the  plan.  By  1988 only  30% of  retail  sales  were 
made  at plan prices.7 Market prices exceeded  plan prices by a premium 
which  rose  steadily  up  to  42% as  macroeconomic  demand  pressures 
intensified  in the course  of decentralization.8  By 1985 75% of state com- 
mercial companies  had been  sold  or leased  to private owners;  by  1990 
hordes  of private  and  cooperative  firms,  as well  as joint ventures,  had 
entered  the commercial  system.  At the same time,  the yuan  was deval- 
7. The share  of sales  at nonplan  prices  includes  17% at "guidance"  prices that generally 
moved  with  free prices. 
8. Zou  (1992) traces out  the  evolution  of the  dual  pricing  system  using  a sample  of 253 
state firms and urban collectives;  the latter sold and purchased  a higher share of goods 
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ued,  and a variety of other measures  was introduced  with the intention 
of opening  up international  trade to market forces on a limited  basis. 
Phase  II saw  two important  reforms in the area of industrial property 
rights. Rural Township  and Village Enterprises (TVEs) actually had their 
roots  in  earlier  programs  of  rural industrialization,  but  in  1984 local 
governments  were  given  permission  to  pursue  a TVE-based  develop- 
ment  strategy  to help  absorb labor released  by the agricultural reforms. 
Together with  growth  of urban collectives,  the explosion  of TVE activity 
resulted  in  progressive  diversification  of  industrial  ownership  away 
from the  SOEs in favor of the  so-called  nonstate  sector,  although  most 
of this was  still within  the public domain  (see  Fig. 3).9 
The second  major industrial reform in Phase II was the adoption  after 
1987 of  the  contract  management  responsibility  system.  Performance 
contracts with  enterprise  managers  specified  profit remittance,  produc- 
tivity,  and sometimes  innovation  targets. To increase the range of man- 
agement  discretion,  all new  workers  after 1986 were  to be  hired  on  a 
contract  system,  thus  raising,  at  least  theoretically,  the  possibility  of 
dismissal. 
Decentralizing  management  and  progressively  introducing  market 
forces  made  little sense,  however,  in an environment  where  all indus- 
trial profits were remitted to the state. Phase II, therefore,  saw an impor- 
tant  series  of  reforms  to  decentralize  resource  allocation  away  from 
government.  These included  reform of enterprise  taxation in 1984-1985, 
which  replaced  remittances  by negotiated  profits taxes.  In 1986, central 
government  entered  into  a "fiscal contract responsibility  system"  with 
local governments,  which  had in fact long  been  responsible  for the col- 
lection  of almost  all taxes.  As discussed  later, resource  decentralization 
was  more effective  than expected,  and this led to a sharp drop in reve- 
nues  and  overheating  of the economy. 
Finally,  initial steps  were  taken in Phase II to lay the basis for a com- 
mercial financial  system,  but  this  was  limited  by  the  partial nature  of 
other  reforms,  in  particular,  of  ownership.  Further development,  this 
time  of stock markets  on a limited  basis,  did not  take place until some 
years later. 
2.3 PHASE  III:  1989-1990 
Macroeconomic  stabilization  and the political crackdown  following  Tia- 
nanmen  Square involved  the temporary reimposition  of a range of direct 
9. Only  about  10% of China's  industry  is individually  owned  or joint venture.  The bulk 
of the "nonstate"  sector consists  of urban collectives  and firms owned  by local govern- 
ments.  The  concepts  of  ownership  and  property  rights  are  not  well  developed  in 
China's  legal code. Can Communist Economies  Transform  Incrementally?  The Experience  of China ? 99 
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controls.  Plan prices  began  to be  adjusted  toward  market levels  so  as 
to start to merge  the  two  price systems  into  one  (see  Fig. 2). 
Phase  III also  saw  the  acceleration  of  trade  and  payments  reform. 
Progressive  devaluations  in  Phases  I and  II had  depreciated  the  real 
exchange  rate relative to the dollar by over 50% (see Fig. 4). As domestic 
demand  was  reined  in,  exports  responded.  Foreign  exchange  trading 
centers were  opened,  and the black market premium  fell, to a minimum 
Figure 4 OPENING  THE  ECONOMY 
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of only 7% in 1991. By then,  about one third of international transactions 
were  taking place at the parallel market rate. 
2.4 PHASE  IV: 1991 ONWARDS 
This phase  marked a return to active reforms with further marketization 
(including  growth  of final markets) and decentralization.  There was also 
significant  reduction  in  redundant  labor in  the  state  sector  and  some 
privatization  of  state  enterprises.  Growth  picked  up,  with  some  signs 
of overheating.  Social-sector  reforms began  in areas such as health  and 
housing,  although  on a cautious  and experimental  basis. 
2.5 COMPARISON  WITH  REFORMS  IN EE AND THE  FSU 
Space does  not permit a detailed  comparison  of China's reform process 
with  those  of EE and the FSU.10 Considering  pre-1990 Poland and Hun- 
gary, there are indeed  similarities but also some  important  differences. 
China's  opening  up to trade and foreign investment,  its massive  decol- 
lectivization  of agriculture,  liberalization of the distribution  system,  and 
growth  of  nonstate  industry  involved  a  far stronger  commitment  to 
marketization  and  domestic  competition.  On  the  other  hand,  it main- 
tained  central planning  and  a distinctive  two-price  system. 
The most  obvious  differences  between  China's  policies  and  those  of 
East European  countries  after 1990 include  the partial nature of its price 
and  trade  liberalization,  its  incomplete  reform  of property  rights,  and 
the  quite  different  phasing  of  macroeconomic  stabilization  and  struc- 
tural reforms.  The  initial  core  of  most  EE reform  programs  involved 
macrostabilization,  which  was  partly effected  through  the liberalization 
of prices  and  markets.  In China,  however,  the  need  for a stabilization 
phase  (which  during  1988-1991  involved  some  regression  from liberal- 
ization)  followed from  the  implementation  of  its  systemic  reform  pro- 
gram.11 China's price and trade liberalization also coincided  with,  rather 
than preceded,  ownership  diversification  and liberalization of the distri- 
bution  system.12 
10. Fischer  and Gelb (1991)  and Gelb and Gray  (1991)  consider the phasing of European- 
style transformation  programs.  Bruno (1992)  reviews stabilization  programs. 
11. The closest analog in Europe and the FSU is the phase of fiscal distress that has 
followed the postreform collapse of enterprise profits and tax revenues. See, e.g., 
Schaffer  (1992). 
12. By 1985, when the share of state-fixed  prices in retail sales had fallen to 50%, state 
enterprises produced less than 40% of goods sold on retail markets, and nonstate 
industry produced almost 40% of industrial output. Some of this was due to the 
prereform  structure  of China's economy, but it also reflected  progressive  ownership 
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3.  China's Performance  in a Comparative  Context 
Tables 2 and  3 show  selected  economic  and  social data for China and 
(1) India, similarly large, and low-income,  but with a (regulated) market 
economy  and  a democratic  polity;  (2) Korea, Indonesia,  Thailand,  and 
the province  of Taiwan,  considered  as high-performing  East Asian mar- 
ket economies;  and  (3) Hungary,  Poland,  FSU, and Yugoslavia,  which 
developed  under  central  planning  and  one-party  regimes  and  which 
also implemented  decentralizing  reforms. 
3.1 HOW RICH  IS CHINA? 
It has  long  been  recognized  that exchange-rate  based  (Atlas) methods 
of calculating income  per capita understate  "real" levels  for many coun- 
tries.13 From  Table  2,  the  divergence  between  these  two  measures  is 
especially  large for China, which  appears by the 1980s as more a middle- 
income  than a poor country and to have outstripped  India in PPP terms. 
This perspective  should  be borne in mind when  one is comparing  social 
statistics. 
3.2 HOW FAST  HAS CHINA GROWN? 
In contrast to the dismal  1960s, China boosted  its growth  rate dramati- 
cally in the 1970s and 1980s, to 10% in the latter period,  eclipsing  India's 
efforts  and  matching  the  performance  of  the  East Asian  comparators. 
The socialist  comparators  stagnated  before experiencing  a sharp output 
loss  after 1989. Population  growth  slowed  in China as in East Asia,  to 
well  below  Indian levels  but still far above  rates in the socialist compa- 
rators.14 
3.3 DID GROWTH  REFLECT  ACCUMULATION  OR EFFICIENCY? 
Table 2 shows  investment  rates and rough  derived  efficiency  measures 
(the inverse  of the  incremental  capital/output  ratio). China appears  as 
a high-investment  country  that boosted  its efficiency  from low levels  to 
those  characteristic of East Asia.  The contrast with  India,  and with  the 
collapse  of  efficiency  in  the  socialist  comparators,  is  marked.  China's 
investment  was overwhelmingly  financed  through domestic  savings: By 
the  1990s its net foreign  debt was  only  3% of GDP compared  with  22% 
for India and 53% for socialist  comparators. 
China's  investment  rates are probably biased  upwards,  however,  by 
13. See,  e.g.,  the  World Bank  Atlas, World Bank (1992c). 
14. China's  PPP growth  rates are close  to those  of its Atlas GNP per head; for the other 
countries,  PPP income  per  head  grows  rather more  slowly  than  Atlas  income  per 
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gross  understatement  of GDP levels.  Applying  a uniform  level  correc- 
tion based  on Keidel (1992) lowers  them by almost one third. The effect 
would  be  to boost  efficiency,  to well  above  the East Asian  comparator 
levels  in the reform period. 
3.4 HOW FAST  HAS CHINA OPENED  ITS  ECONOMY? 
As shown,  China's export growth  rates in the 1980s compare with those 
of the  East Asian  countries  in the  1960s and  1970s. Its trade ratio, too, 
has  risen  sharply,  especially  for so large a country,  but it is difficult to 
assess  its  openness  from  trade/GDP  measures  because  of  the  uncer- 
tainty of the  denominator.15 
3.5 HOW FAST  HAS CHINA MONETIZED? 
China's  low  inflation  during  the  1960s and  1970s was  due  to price con- 
trols,  but  it  also  contained  inflation  to  East Asian  levels  through  the 
period  of  price  liberalization-a  marked  contrast  to  European  reform 
socialist experience.16 From Table 2 one can see that financial deepening 
proceeded  apace  in  China  through  the  reforms,  even  as  most  prices 
were  liberalized.  Therefore  there was  probably no  appreciable  "mone- 
tary overhang"  at the start of the reforms.  The range of assets  available 
to  the  population,  while  widening  somewhat,  is still limited,  and  this 
may also have encouraged  financial asset accumulation  as incomes  rose. 
3.6 DO SOCIAL  INDICATORS  CONFIRM  THAT  THERE  HAS BEEN  RAPID 
DEVELOPMENT  IN CHINA? 
Whatever  the  controversies  surrounding  output  data,  it  is  harder  to 
dispute  the  many  social  indicators  that measure  improvements  in the 
quality  of life.  Table 3 shows  that life expectancy  has  risen  and  infant 
mortality  fallen  to  levels  characteristic  of  far richer countries.  The  ex- 
traordinarily rapid decline  in birth rates shown  in Figure 1 has reduced 
the age dependency  ratio sharply.17 The decline  in birth rates is related 
to other factors, including  female labor force participation and education 
15. China's ratio of exports plus imports  to GDP rose from 7%  in the 1960s  to 21%  by the 
1980s  and 33%  in the 90s. Of perhaps more importance  than this ratio,  China's  export 
mix also diversified  and moved toward more sophisticated  products. In contrast,  the 
European  countries, locked in the CMEA  system, experienced "technical  export re- 
gression" toward primary  products. See Gelb and Gray (1991),  Annex 1. 
16. Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991) considers the relationship between money overhang, price 
liberalization,  and inflation  in China and other socialist  countries. China's financiali- 
zation ratios, like the trade and investment ratios, may be biased upwards by the 
understatement  of yuan GDP. 
17. However, the age dependency rate  will increase  sharply  with the aging of the popula- 
tion to one of the highest levels in the world as the aging population profile comes 
to resemble those of Japan  and Korea. Table 2  SELECTED ECONOMIC  INDICATORS 
1960s Average  1970s Average  1980s Average  1990-91a 
Level of per capita GNP (PPP in 85 constant dollars) 
China  647  1004  1712  n/a 
East Asia  1084  1946  3122  n/a 
Socialist  Comparators  2165  3800  4559  n/a 
India  613  642  687  n/a 
Ratio of PPP/Atlas per capita GNP (in 85 constant dollars) 
China  9.41  8.94  8.66  n/a 
East Asia  2.81  2.77  2.80  n/a 
Socialist Comparators  5.29  3.97  3.99  n/a 
India  3.22  3.00  2.68  n/a 
Growth rate of per capita GNP (atlas in 85 constant dollars) 
China  1.21  5.53  7.62  4.85 
East Asia  4.67  6.42  6.67  5.16 
Socialist  Comparators  5.70  5.09  0.59  -8.60 
India  1.47  0.73  3.50  1.54 
Investment ratio 
China  0.21  0.30  0.35  0.36 
East Asia  0.18  0.26  0.27  0.34 
Socialist  Comparators  0.30e  0.34e  0.31  0.23d 
India  0.16  0.20  0.23  0.22 
Efficiency  (IOCR)b 
China  0.16  0.25  0.26  0.12 
East Asia  0.44  0.33  0.27  0.24 
Socialist  Comparators  n/a  0.17  0.06  -0.34 
India  0.23  0.16  0.26  0.25 Growth  of exports 
China  1.98  5.69  14.49  9.87 
East Asia  15.30  18.05  9.48  10.73 
Socialist Comparators  n/a  6.70d  2.70d  5.399 
India  2.27  7.97  6.42  n/a 
Inflationb 
China  1.08  0.75  8.15  1.29 
East Asia  29.82  12.42  7.12  6.79 
Socialist Comparators  12.51f  6.79  64.39  180.07 
India  6.03  7.54  9.12  11.42 
M2/GDP 
China  n/a  0.28  0.55  0.89 
East Asia  0.20  0.34  0.54  0.79 
Socialist Comparators  0.51f  0.64f  0.54d  0.37d 
India  0.22  0.29  0.42  0.46 
Source:  World Bank for most  of  the variables.  PPP values  taken  from Summers  and  Heston  (1991). The  Penn  World Table (Mark 5): An  Expanded  Set  of 
International  Comparisons,  1950-1988, The  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  pp. 327-368. 
Notes:  East  Asia represented  by Indonesia, Korea,  Taiwan  and Thailand;  Socialist  Comparators  are Hungary, Poland, Former  USSR  and Yugoslavia. 
aData not available  for 1991  in some cases. 
hIOCR =  GDP Growth  Rate/Investment  Rate 
dAverage  of Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. 
eAverage  of Hungary  and Yugoslavia  only. 
'Average  for Yugoslavia  only. 
.Average for Poland only. 
hInflation  computed for CPI. Table 3  SELECTED SOCIAL INDICATORS 
1960s Average  1970s Average  1980s Average  1990-1991* 
Life expectancy 
China  52.66  64.37  68.58  70.28 
East Asia  55.62  61.25  65.82  68.13 
Socialist comparators  68.20  69.32  69.98  71.39 
India  44.87  50.12  56.36  59.21 
Infant mortality rate 
China  105.30  51.00  35.59  28.88 
East Asia  n/a  69.78a  48.06a  35.18a 
Socialist comparators  46.55  30.66  22.72  17.00 
India  n/a  130.14  104.43  91.90 
Age dependency  ratio [=  (under 15 and over 64)1(15-64)] 
China  0.79  0.76  0.57  0.49 
East Asia  0.87  0.77  0.63  0.54 
Socialist comparators  0.57  0.52  0.52  0.51 
India  0.78  0.77  0.72  0.70 Women's participation  in labor  force [=  (female labor*100)/female  population] 
China  44.19  44.52  48.48  52.20 
East Asia  29.12a  30.58a  32.36a  33.17a 
Socialist  comparators  38.33  41.01  42.22  42.35 
India  28.41  24.98  22.01  20.95 
Gross enrollment ratio: secondary 
China  n/a  24.00  50.38  40.50 
East Asia  n/a  22.67a  42.81a  54.33a 
Socialist  comparators  n/a  69.77  80.08  82.25 
India  n/a  26.50C  31.00  38.50 
Gross enrollment ratio, females: primary 
China  n/a  113.67  113.10  n/a 
East Asia  77.33  91.50  103.96  99.00b 
Socialist  comparators  102.88  98.29  100.02  n/a 
India  48.50  61.83  76.20  n/a 
Source:  United Nations Social Indicators  Database. 
Notes:  East Asia represented  by Indonesia, Korea,  Taiwan and Thailand;  Socialist  Comparators  are Hungary, Poland, Former  USSR  and Yugoslavia.  Gross 
enrollment  ratio  is defined as gross enrollment  (in all streams)  of all ages at the primary/secondary/tertiary  level as a percentage  of school-age population 
as defined by each country and reported to Unesco. Many countries  consider  primary  school age to be 6-11 years and secondary  to be 12-17 years. This 
ratio  may be greater  than 100%  if some pupils are outside the country's  standard  age-range. 
aAverage  of Indonesia, Korea,  and Thailand. 
hAverage  of Korea  and Thailand  only. 
'Average of Indonesia, Korea,  and Thailand. 
*Data  not available  for 1991  in some cases. 108 *  GELB,  JEFFERSON,  & SINGH 
(especially  of women).  Female participation in the labor force has always 
been  high  in China,  and it has largely closed  the gender  education  gap, 
completely  at primary levels. 
3.7 DO SOCIAL  POLICIES  ACCOUNT  FOR  ECONOMIC  SUCCESS? 
Most  of China's  favorable  social  indicators  primarily reflect policies  in 
the prereform period,  and an interesting  question  is the extent to which 
these  have  contributed  to postreform  economic  performance.  In addi- 
tion  to  the  broad  issue  of  the  importance  of human  capital formation 
for growth,  one  may  wonder  about  the  impact  of sharp  demographic 
transition  on  growth.  This is a controversial  topic beyond  the  scope  of 
this  paper.  In contrast  with  previous  analyses,  some  recent  studies  in 
the  1980s do suggest  the emergence  of a negative  relationship  between 
population  and  GDP growth  rates. There is at least one  study  (Barlow, 
1992) that suggests  that a sudden  reduction  in fertility rates raises out- 
put growth considerably  over the next 12 years. Extrapolating his results 
to  China  would  suggest  a remarkably large  impact  of the  fertility de- 
clines  of  the  1970s  on  China's  growth  in  the  1980s.  Barlow's  results 
seem  extreme  and  are  certainly  not  uncontested.  But even  if  greatly 
discounted,  they  suggest  the  possible  explanatory  power  of  China's 
demographic  transition  of  the  1970s  in  boosting  an  otherwise  sound 
economic  response  to  systemic  reforms  to  stellar  proportions  in  the 
1980s.18 
3.8 A SUMMING  UP 
Precise judgments  on China's income  level and economic  characteristics 
confront  data  problems,  but  its  economic  performance  in  the  reform 
period  resembles  that of the dynamic  East Asian  comparators.  In social 
dimensions,  China  is a real outlier,  suggesting  the  success  of its basic 
needs  strategy.  The contribution  of the social dimension  to growth  over 
the last 15 years is difficult to assess,  but it may be considerable. 
18. For reviews of this area, see Srinivasan  (1992), Blanchet  (1992),  Kelley and Schmidt 
(1992), and references cited therein. Barlow  (1992)  suggests that a sudden reduction 
of fertility  causing a permanent  reduction  of about one percentage  point in the annual 
net birth rate will cause output to be higher by 21%  at the end of 12 years. By this 
standard, China's decline in fertility would have accounted for an increase in real 
output of 42%  at the end of 12 years! Barlow's  coefficients  seem unreasonably  high- 
for one thing, there is insufficient cross-country  evidence of the large response in 
intermediate  variables,  such as savings and female participation  rates, that would be 
needed to produce so large  a growth response to the demographic  transition;  for more 
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4. Intensive  Versus  Extensive  Factors  in China's  Performance 
The  growth  accounting  exercise  in Table 4 shows  that growth  and  its 
sources have varied significantly  by subperiod  in China. Factor accumu- 
lation  has  accounted  for most  growth,  but  beginning  with  Phase  I of 
the  reforms  in  the  late  1970s  and  continuing  through  Phase  II, TFP 
rose at 2.8-3.8%.  The phase  of macroeconomic  stabilization in Phase III 
caused  a sharp  reduction  in  growth  during  1989-1991,  which  in  turn 
led  to stagnant  or even  declining  residual  productivity.  In 1992 growth 
rates have  returned  to their pre-1989 double-digit  levels. 
Table 5 shows  the large structural change  in sectoral shares  of Gross 
Social Product (GSP) and also,  within  industry  by ownership  type,  that 
accompanied  reform. After falling as China industrialized,  agriculture's 
share of GSP rose through  Phase  I and declined  thereafter. Meanwhile, 
industrial  ownership  diversified  considerably. 
Productivity  growth  has varied  significantly  across sectors  as well  as 
over time: Table 6 summarizes  various results.  TFP growth in agriculture 
appears  to have  soared  from negative  levels  to account for much of the 
rapid growth  after 1978. According  to Lin, Burcroff, and Feder (1993), 
almost  half  of  the  42.2%  growth  of  output  in  the  cropping  sector  in 
1978-1984  was  driven  by productivity  change  caused  by reforms.  Spe- 
cifically,  almost  all of  the  productivity  growth  was  attributable to  the 
changes  resulting  from the introduction  of the household  responsibility 
system.19 TFP measures  for agriculture as a whole  are not available for 
the most recent period,  but if we assume  that labor productivity  growth 
is somewhat  higher  than TFP growth,  the 3% rate of labor productivity 
growth  during  1984-1988  implies  that  TFP declined  relative  to  1978- 
1984 but remained  well  above  its prereform levels.20 
Chen  et  al.  (1988) find  that  from  1978 to  1985, TFP in state industry 
(SOEs) rose  at 5.2%, far above  the  estimated  level  of about  1% in the 
previous  two decades.  Jefferson, Rawski,  and Zheng  (JRZ) (1992) inves- 
tigate TFP growth  with  capital, labor, and intermediate  inputs:  During 
1980-1988  their single-factor  productivity  rose  at rates of 2.1,  5.2,  and 
2.1%,  respectively.  A  measure  of  TFP growth  formed  by  any  linear 
combination  of these  rates would  yield  a composite  rate of productivity 
growth  somewhere  within  this  range.  They  estimate  TFP growth  of 
19. McMillan,  Whalley,  and  Zhu  (1989)  estimate  that  three  quarters  of  the  measured 
productivity  increase  was  due  to changes  in the incentive  system  associated  with  the 
household  responsibility  system  and the remainder  to price increases. 
20. Rawski suggests,  however,  that the agricultural labor force may have been  systemati- 
cally overestimated  in recent years.  If so,  TFP may have  continued  at higher  rates. 110 *  GELB,  JEFFERSON,  & SINGH 
2.40%  in  1980-1988,  1.80%  during  1980-1984,  and  3.01%  during 
1984-1988. 
Using  the  same  procedures,  JRZ (1992) estimate  TFP growth  for the 
collective  industry (urban collectives  and TVEs established  at or above the 
township  level)  at 4.63% for the period  1980-1988.  For the subperiods, 
collective  sector  TFP rose  at  rates  of  3.45  during  1980-1984  and  5.86 
during  1984-1988. 
These  data show  a consistent  pattern  of higher  productivity  growth 
during  the  reform  period.  While  TFP in  nonstate  industry  rose  more 
Table 4  SOURCES  OF GROWTH 
Growth  rate 
of net material  Contribution  Contribution 
product  of increase  of increase  Contribution 
(1980  prices)  in K stock  in L force  of TFP  growth 
(y)  (OKK)  (tLL)  (TFP) 
1955-1965  4.31  1.50  5.79  -2.98 
1965-1978  6.40  1.55  3.64  1.20 
1978-1984  7.98  1.83  3.31  2.84 
1984-1988  10.12  1.80  4.51  3.82 
1988-1991  5.30  1.43  4.37  -0.50 
Data  sources:  SSB  (1991)  p. 401;  SSB  (1992),  pp. 33, 97, 401, 406-407, 413. 
These figures are derived from an aggregate  production  function  converted  into the standard  growth 
accounting  form: 
y  =  tfp +  tKk  +  aL1. 
Table 5  SECTORAL  SHARES  OF CHINA'S  GROSS  SOCIAL  PRODUCTa 
1952  1978  1984  1990 
Agriculture  45.4  20.4  24.4  20.2 
(28.4)  (33.0)  (28.4) 
Industry  34.4  61.9  57.8  63.0 
(44.8)  (40.1)  (39.5) 
Of which: 
State-owned  41.5  77.6  69.1  54.6 
Collective  3.3  22.4  29.7  35.6 
Other  55.2b  0.0  1.2  9.8 
Services and  14.6  9.4  8.2  9.0 
transportation  (23.0)  (21.9)  (27.2) 
Data  sources:  SSB  (1991),  pp. 31, 50, 396. 
aThe  figures  not in parentheses  represent  Social  Gross  Product,  i.e., they are inclusive  of intermediate 
inputs at the level of the producer. The figures in parentheses are shares based on GNP that are 
exclusive  of intermediate  inputs. Also note: industry  includes construction. 
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Table 6  SECTORAL SOURCES OF GROWTH, 1962-1988 
Industry 
Agriculture  State  Collective 
1955-1965 
Total  1.8 
TFP  -0.6  (0.8)a 
0.80c 
1965-1978 
Total  2.9 
TFP  -1.0  (0.9) 
1978-1984 
Total  8.0  (8.49)  (14.03) 
TFP  5.9  (6.2)b  5.2  (1.80)a  (3.45) 
1984-1988 
Total  4.0  (10.22)  (19.86) 
TFP  (3.0)  (3.01)  (5.86) 
aFigures  for labor productivity  (in parentheses) and TFP for 1955-1965 and 1965-1978 are drawn 
from A. Tang (1981)  "Chinese  Agriculture:  Its Problems  and Prospects,"  working  paper No. 82-W09, 
Department  of Economics,  Vanderbilt  University. 
bTFP and labor  productivity  figures  drawn from McMillan  et al. (1989). 
'For the period 1953-1978. 
dThe  figures in parentheses  are TFP  measures  for capital,  labor, and intermediate  inputs. The earlier 
figures cover 1980-1984,  not 1978-1984. 
rapidly  than  in  the  SOEs,  productivity  in  state  industry  rose  at  rates 
that  had  been  unachieved  since  the  early  1950s.21  There  are  biases  in 
these  figures,22  but  these  are  unlikely  to  overturn  these  broad  conclu- 
sions. 
21. These results for state industry are consistent with Beck  and Bohnet (undated), Zou 
(1992),  based on a sample of 254 enterprises, and other studies that properly  deflate 
the capital  stock and remove nonproduction  inputs of capital  and labor. 
22. Output deflators are biased downward, thus leading to excessively high reports of 
industrial  output growth. In the state sector, the principal  source of this bias in the 
1980s  was product  innovation. When a new product  is introduced,  as for other prod- 
ucts, enterprises are expected to report industrial  output in both current and 1980 
prices. As a matter  of practice  (and because there may be no comparable  product  with 
a known 1980 price), they often used the price posted at the time the product was 
introduced  in lieu of the 1980 price. This introduces  systematic  bias into measures of 
GVIO  in 1980  prices, particularly  in industries  within which new product  innovation 
is widespread. Jefferson  (1991)  suggests that these biases may run from virtually  zero 
in industries  in which there is little product  innovation,  such as oil and gas production 
to as high as 7.8%  in the electrical  machinery  industry where during 1980-1985, the 
annual rate of growth was reported to be 25%. Overall, he estimates upward bias 
from spurious accounting procedures  associated with new product innovation to be 
in the vicinity of 1%. Rawski (1992a)  discusses bias in the output deflators  available 
for the collective  sector. They may equal or even exceed that for state industry  but do 
not change the qualitative  finding of rapid productivity  growth within that sector. 112 *  GELB,  JEFFERSON,  & SINGH 
Table 7  LEVELS  OF TFP  IN STATE  AND COLLECTIVE  INDUSTRY 
State  industry  Collective  industry 
1980  2.18  2.28 
1984  2.34  2.64 
1988  2.63  3.04 
Index for 1988 (1980  =  100)  120.6  133.3 
Source:  Jefferson  and Rawski  (1992),  p. 52. 
Table 8  COMPARATIVE  LEVELS  OF INDUSTRIAL  TFP  GROWTH 
Country  Period  Estimate 
China"  1957-1978 (SOE)  0.4 
1978-1985  (SOE)  4.8 
Chinab  1980-1988 (SOE)  2.4 
1980-1988  (COE)  4.6 
Hong Kong  1960-1970  3.2 
Singapore  1960-1970  3.6 
Taiwan  1955-1970  5.4 
Korea  1960-1970  3.7 
1960-1977  3.7 
Turkey  1963-1976  1.3 
Yugoslavia  1965-1978  0.5 
India  1959-1979  -0.3 
Sources: 
aChen  et al. (1988). 
bJefferson,  Rawski,  and Zheng (1992). 
'All other figures are from I. J. Ahluwlia  (1991). 
4.1 PRODUCTIVITY  LEVELS  BY OWNERSHIP  TYPE 
Table 7, based on the JRZ calculations,  shows  that, while TFP in China's 
TVEs and  SOEs  were  approximately  equal  in  1980, by  1988 the  TVE 
sector  had  achieved  a  clear  productivity  level  margin  over  the  state- 
owned  enterprises.  Preliminary  results  from  disaggregated  analysis 
show  a somewhat  more mixed  picture,  however.23 
In order to give  some  perspective  to the productivity  growth  perfor- 
mance  of Chinese  industry,  Table 8 summarizes  estimates  of TFP from 
various  sources.  Prior to  the  reforms,  Chinese  industrial  TFP growth 
23. A comparison  of levels and rates  of growth of TFP  in SOEs  and TVEs  in seven two-digit 
enterprises shows TVE productivity  in 1989 to be higher in construction  materials, 
metal products, and machinery,  but lower in food, textiles, papermaking,  and home 
appliances (Jefferson, 1993). The growth of TFP among the TVEs  was higher in all 
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compared  with  that of Turkey,  Yugoslavia,  and India during  the  1960s 
and 1970s, but after reforms it accelerated to a range comparable to that 
of East Asian  NICs  during  the  1960s. 
4.2 REFORMS  AND EFFICIENCY:  MORE  EVIDENCE 
A number of studies  using  enterprise-level  data have examined  patterns 
of changing  resource  allocation  and  efficiency  within  China's  industry 
in ways  that help  assess  the impact of reforms.24 
1. Studies  tend  to show  evidence  of gains in allocative efficiency  that 
are compatible  with  the spread of broad market forces. Naughton  (1992) 
shows  convergence  of  profit rates  across  38 industrial  branches,  with 
the  coefficient  of variation  declining  from 0.78 in 1980 to 0.44 in 1989. 
In a similar vein,  Jefferson and Xu (forthcoming)  evaluate  gains in allo- 
cative efficiency  among  226 large and medium-size  SOEs at the core of 
the state system.  Over the period  1980-1989,  among  enterprises  within 
the  same  industrial  branches  and  enterprises  operating  under  similar 
pricing regimes,  they find patterns of convergence  of average productiv- 
ities  for capital and labor and,  to a lesser  extent,  for materials.  Conver- 
gence  is most  rapid and complete  among  enterprises  that operate  fully 
outside  the plan. 
2. Jefferson and Xu (1992) investigate  patterns of convergence  among 
measures  of total factor productivity  (technical efficiency).  During 1980- 
1989, enterprises  within  8 of 10 industries  demonstrate  a tendency  for 
TFP to  converge.  Results  by  Xiao (1990) using  a sample  of  903 SOEs 
and  other research  on  steel  plants  also  show  tendencies  for TFP to be- 
come  more  equal.  There  also  seems  to be  a link between  exposure  to 
market  forces  and  TFP growth.  As  with  gains  in allocative  efficiency, 
gains  in  technical  efficiency  are most  pronounced  among  enterprises 
operating  outside  the plan in Jefferson and Xu (1992). Zou (1992) found 
that ownership  by itself  provided  a statistically  significant  explanation 
of differences  in TFP. But when  a carefully constructed  measure  of de- 
gree of marketization  (including  the market share of sales and material 
purchases  and  price  spreads)  is added,  Zou  found  that this  degree  of 
marketization  was  a more  powerful  explanation  of  TFP growth  than 
was  ownership  type. 
3. There also  appears  to have  been  increasing  innovation  in China's 
enterprises.  A  survey  of  250  enterprises  by  Jefferson,  Rawski,  and 
Zheng  (1992) found  evidence  of  increasing  rates  of  innovation.  Over 
24. In addition  to  these  studies,  we  note  that  most  studies  find  evidence  of increasing 
returns to scale at the enterprise  level,  and because  the number of SOEs grew at only 
0.9% in 1980-1989,  average  gross  output  per enterprise  in 1980 prices rose at 9.8%. 114 *  GELB,  JEFFERSON,  & SINGH 
90% of  the  leading  innovators  were  considered  (by  enterprises  of  all 
types)  to be in the  state sector. 
4.3 BENEATH  THE  NUMBERS:  RELATING  PERFORMANCE  TO REFORMS 
The micro-level  and regional  studies  noted  earlier indicate  that the rise 
in TFP growth within  state industry  originated both from gains in alloca- 
tive and technical  efficiency  and from accelerating innovation.  They are 
internally  consistent  and suggestive  of the ways  in which  such  specific 
reforms  as  progressive  marketization,  diversification  of  ownership  to- 
ward the nonstate  sector, and the open-door  policy have contributed  to 
improved  productivity.  However,  there is not unanimity  among  China 
scholars in this area. Some  studies  find evidence  of chaotic institutional 
arrangements,  redundant  and  undisciplined  labor, interference  by su- 
pervisory bodies,  ill-defined  ownership,  and bank lending  with no pros- 
pect of repayment.  We do not deny that these problems are widespread, 
and that there are a number of "soft spots" in the reform process.25 The 
weight  of  the  quantitative  micro-evidence  confirms,  however,  that on 
balance  the  impact  of  the  reform  process  on  efficiency  has  been  fa- 
vorable. 
Because  evidence  on the reasons  for the boost  in agricultural produc- 
tivity  seems  reasonably  clear,  we  focus  on  two  key  questions  raised 
by China's  industrial  reform program: (1) How  has incremental  reform 
improved  the  SOEs' performance  despite  the  less  favorable impacts  of 
such  reforms  in  Hungary  (for over  two  decades)  and  Poland  (for one 
decade)?  And  (2) Why  has  the  TVE sector  boomed  despite  not  being 
really  private?  Just what  kind  of  firms  are these?  How  do  incentives 
work  for (and against)  TVE efficiency? 
4.4 THE  SOEs 
To  understand  the  way  in  which  China's  industrial  reforms  have 
worked,  it is useful  to distinguish  between  so-called  improving  reforms 
and  end-state  reforms.  The  1980s industrial  reform program created  a 
set  of  incentives  and  opportunities  that  shifted  the  SOE institutional 
efficiency  frontier  outwards,  closer  to best  practice.  Pre- and  post-tax 
enterprise  profits  are correlated  and  have  become  more  closely  so  (in 
general) as reforms have progressed.  Moreover,  tax rates have not typi- 
cally been  revised  ex post  on the basis of performance.26 Although  bad 
25. For more discussion,  see,  e.g.,  Fan and Woo (1992), Stepanek  (1991), and the excellent 
review  of Walder (1987). 
26. A study of 230 enterprises  showed  that when  profitability during the first management 
contract period  (typically  1987-1990)  exceeded  expectations  (i.e.,  the profit remittance 
rate was lower and the retention  rate was higher than expected),  subsequent  contracts 
tended  to validate  the  lower  profit remittance  and  higher  retention  rates rather than 
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for fiscal revenues,  this  implies  stronger  incentives.  Among  SOEs the 
relationship  between  workers'  bonuses  and  enterprise  profitability be- 
came  stronger  during  the  1980s (Rawski,  1992b). Enterprises  for which 
the strongest  incentive  structures  have been  created and have  received 
the  greatest  autonomy  have  succeeded  in  motivating  the  largest  in- 
creases in labor productivity  (McMillan and Naughton,  1992). The intro- 
duction  of  incentives  has  also  motivated  factory  managers  to  raise 
efficiency  (Jefferson  and  Xu,  1992). Groves  et al.  (1992) argue  that the 
reforms introduced  many of the incentives  present  in Western manage- 
rial labor markets, although  in somewhat  different forms. It also appears 
that investment  out  of retained  profits  yields  higher  growth  of capital 
productivity  than  investment  financed  by government  and bank loans 
(Jefferson  and  Xu,  1992) and  that  there  are increasingly  strong  links 
between  profitability  and  expansion.  Jefferson  and  Xu (1992) find  this 
profit-expansion  link  to be  statistically  significant  for a sample  of  110 
iron and  steel  mills,  at the core of the state system. 
Although  this paper cannot go into deep comparative detail, available 
evidence  seems  to indicate  that the  limited  reform initiatives  taken by 
Hungary  and Poland before 1990 did not result in similar improvements 
in  incentives  and  performance.  Rawski  (1992b) contrasts  his  findings 
for  China  with  those  for  Hungary  (due  to  Kornai and  Matits,  1987) 
which,  despite  years  of  reform  socialism,  had  a  tax  system  that  left 
little relationship  between  pre- and post-tax profitability. Schaffer (1990) 
found  a  similarly  small  relationship  for  pre-big-bang  Poland.  Estrin, 
Schaffer,  and  Singh  (1992) actually  found  a perverse  relationship  be- 
tween  increases  in profits and wages  in 1989-1990. 
In addition,  the  changes  in China's  incentive  system  are unlikely  to 
have had as much effect were it not for the explosive  growth of competi- 
tion  from outside the  state sector.  In contrast to pre-1990 EE, entry and 
competition  grew from two contrasting  sources.  The first was the open- 
door policy,  comprising  trade and joint venture investment.  Preliminary 
analysis  by Singh,  Xiao, and Ratha (1993) suggests  that an "open-door" 
dummy  for the  four  provinces  closest  to Hong  Kong  and  Taiwan  is  a 
significant  explanator  of the  growth  rate of gross  industrial  output.  By 
the  1990s, two  thirds of all exports came from special enterprise  zones, 
with the state sector accounting  for two thirds of these  and the nonstate 
sector  for the  remainder.  Ongoing  research  on  coastal  zones  suggest 
that the  level  of  foreign  investment  is associated  with  provincial-level 
growth  rates.27 The  second  was  the  rapid  entry  of  rural TVEs, which 
has  eliminated  the  traditional  monopoly  of  state  enterprises  in  most 
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branches of industry.  Both of these  sources of competition  have invigor- 
ated  state industry. 
4.5 The TVEs 
As  described  in  Byrd  and  Gelb  (1990),  TVEs are  typically  under  the 
watchful  eye  of  the  local  Industrial  Council,  the  business  arm of  the 
local government,  rather than  being  autonomous  (see  also JRZ, 1992). 
But unlike  the central government,  township  and village  governments 
cannot  engage  directly  in  deficit  financing,  and  there  is  no  effective 
system  of  equalizing  incomes  across  rural  communities.  Therefore, 
these  face a relatively  hard budget  constraint.  Local leaders are heavily 
dependent  on  the  revenue  generated  by  local  industry,  and  revenue 
per resident  can differ enormously  between  successful  and unsuccessful 
localities.  In a variety of ways,  the prestige,  perks, and incomes  of local 
officials respond  to the financial success  of their communities.  Business 
competence  has become  one  factor in their appointment. 
The result  is intense  competition  among  local governments-for  in- 
dustry,  profits,  and  increasingly  for foreign  partners.28 While  govern- 
ments  at various  levels  try to favor "their" enterprises  (e.g.,  by trying 
to ensure  that financial  resources  raised locally are recycled  within  the 
community),  their  ability  to  do  so  is  constrained  by  their  resources. 
Also,  being  smaller,  they  have  less  potential  scope  for protecting  their 
industries,  which  operate  almost  entirely  on free product markets.  The 
fixed-membership  nature of China's communities  provides  a strong nat- 
ural focus  for the  exercise  of ownership  rights,  even  though  these  are 
communal  rather than private.29 
The TVE sector can therefore  be considered  as a quasi-private  sector 
in  terms  of its  governance,  with  an immobile  local community  as  the 
shareholders  in firms operating  mostly  in a market environment.30 The 
international  experience  of similar firms confirms that such a model  has 
the potential  to be competitive.3' 
28. Zweig (1992, 1993)  describes  the competition  for joint ventures between local govern- 
ments. 
29. In some circumstances  poor local  governments  may become "fiscal  predators"  on their 
enterprises-until  the base for such predation  is eliminated;  see Byrd  and Gelb (1990). 
Communities  may also attract  labor  from other localities,  but these are often paid less 
than the locals and share less in the benefits of "ownership." 
30. It is not clear that communal ownership warrants  the term cooperative  culture  as used 
by Weitzman  and Xu (1992),  because the style of government  and corporate  culture 
may be far from cooperative. 
31. Svejnar and Gelb (1990) discuss various international  comparators  to China's rural 
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5. Reform,  Income  Distribution,  and Poverty 
One  of the major questions  about socialist  transformation  is whether  it 
will  lead  to  a widening  of  income  differentials  and  erode  the  strong 
social  safety  net  characteristics  of  communist  systems.  This  section 
therefore  provides  a  brief  overview  of  the  distributional  impact  of 
China's  reforms.32 
Prereform China was a moderately  equal society in terms of measured 
income  distribution.  However,  it was less  egalitarian than the countries 
in Eastern Europe (which  had some  of the most  egalitarian income  dis- 
tributions  in the  world).33 The evolution  of income  inequality  through 
China's  reforms  has reflected  three main developments: 
5.1 (1) URBAN-RURAL  INCOME  DIFFERENTIALS 
At  the  start  of  reforms,  rural income/head  represented  only  42% of 
urban income/head  as conventionally  measured  in China (Fig. 5). This 
was  a wider  divergence  than in India (71%), Thailand (45%), and even 
Brazil (43%); moreover,  weaknesses  in  the  measurement  of  incomes, 
in  particular the  omission  of  subsidies,  probably  understates  the  true 
differential  by  a  considerable  margin.34 These  differentials  have  per- 
sisted  because  of  strict regulation  of  migration  from  the  countryside 
through  the system  of urban registration and because  many benefits  are 
tied to jobs. 
Phase  I of the reform saw  a considerable  narrowing  of the margin as 
compulsory  procurement  was reduced in scope,  agricultural prices were 
raised,  and  the  household  responsibility  system  boosted  productivity. 
The margin widened  again in Phase II, however,  as urban reforms liber- 
alized industrial prices and permitted  greater growth  of urban incomes. 
By 1990 the  measured  ratio of rural to urban incomes  had  fallen back 
to slightly  below  its prereform level. 
Measured  income  is a poor proxy for total income because  it excludes 
so-called  nonwage  income  and subsidy  income  in kind,  particularly im- 
portant  in  the  urban  areas.  A  special  survey  conducted  for  1988 sug- 
gested  that urban incomes  were higher by 54% and rural incomes  higher 
by  39% of  their  conventionally  measured  values.  The  implication  is  a 
considerably  higher  Gini coefficient  for the  overall  country-0.382  for 
1988 compared  with  the "official" estimate  of below  0.33.35 Further, the 
32. It does  not  address  the question  of whether  reforms have  strengthened,  or begun  to 
erode,  health  and  other  social indicators  (see,  e.g.,  Nolan  and Sender,  1992). 
33. For comparisons  of Gini coefficients,  see  Gelb and Gray (1991), Annex  6. 
34. See Zhao  (1992). 
35. Khan et al. (1991), p.  69. 118 * GELB, JEFFERSON, & SINGH 
Figure 5 DISTRIBUTIONAL INDICATORS 
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rise of nonwage  income  relative to wage  income  noted  in the next sec- 
tion suggests  that the ratio of rural to urban incomes  may be increasing 
further.36 
36. The salary reforms  of 1985 sought  to further equalize  urban incomes  by constraining 
differentials.  One  study  estimated  nonwage  income  rising from 26% of wage  income 
in  1985 to 35% in  1990, a consequence  of increased  enterprise  autonomy  in the  face 
of continuing  controls  on state enterprise  pay levels.  Zhao (1992) estimates  that wages 
and bonuses  may amount  to only  about half of urban incomes. 
Absolute  Poverty 
million  people) 
-  300.0 
-  250.0 
-  200.0 
-  150.0 
-  100.0 
50.0  I  I  I  I  I  I  ,  I  II  I  . 
I  I  I  I  i  I  I  I  II  I 
I Can  Communist  Economies  Transform  Incrementally?  The  Experience  of China  * 119 
5.2 (2) RURAL-RURAL  INEQUALITY 
China is a large country  with  highly  differentiated  regional  economies. 
Whereas  urban incomes  have been  very equally distributed  (Gini about 
16% in 1980), there have been  no effective  mechanisms  for rural income 
redistribution.  Income  from  rural nonagricultural  enterprises  has  be- 
come the main factor differentiating  rural incomes  on a communal basis. 
There is no indication  that inequality  is higher within the most industri- 
ally developed  rural areas.37 The evidence  on the evolution  of the rural 
Gini coefficient  during the Phase I of reform is somewhat  contradictory, 
with  some  studies  showing  a  rise  and  others  a  fall.38 However,  the 
growth  of  rural industry  in  Phase  II appears  to have  increased  rural- 
rural inequality,  with  the richest areas growing  faster. 
5.3 (3) THE RISE  OF THE "PRIVATE"  SECTOR 
Cash  incomes  in  the  private  sector,  defined  to include  self-employed, 
private domestic  firms, joint ventures  and foreign-owned  firms are only 
15% higher  than cash incomes  in the urban state sector,  according  to a 
1988 survey.  Distribution  is very  different  in private  and  state  sectors 
however,  with Gini coefficients  of 0.49 and 0.23 according to the survey. 
Private  incomes  at the  high  end  of  the  scale  are probably  due  to  the 
opportunities  to exploit  rents  created from the continuance  of controls 
on prices and  credit, but the  experience  of European  and FSU socialist 
reform also suggests  a tendency  for wide  dispersion  in private incomes 
at the  start of reform. 
5.4 OVERALL  INEQUALITY  AND POVERTY 
As  a result  of these  tendencies,  overall inequality  in China,  appears  to 
have  declined  during  Phase  I of  reform.  Since  then  it has  increased, 
probably  back  to  its  starting  point  but  possibly  more.39 Combining 
growth  and  distributional  effects,  the  first stage  of  the  reform  saw  a 
massive  fall in  the  number  of  people  living  in absolute  poverty,  from 
about 265 million  in 1978 to 90 million in 1984, a decline  from one third 
to  less  than  a  tenth  of  China's  population.40  Despite  continued  high 
growth,  increasing  dispersion  of  income  distribution  then  caused  the 
number to rise slightly,  as shown  in Figure 5. This is significant because 
China has yet to put into place a social safety net appropriate to a market 
37. Zhao (1992). Gelb (1990) also notes  the tendency  toward local equality when  surveying 
TVE workers. 
38. See World Bank (1992b), Chapter 2. 
39. Gini coefficients  from  1981 to  1988 have  been  estimated  on  a household  basis  from 
SSB data. 
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economy and geared to the needs of a growing "floating"  population. 
It may have been wise not to divert effort  in this direction  before reaping 
the growth rewards of reform (and China was perhaps fortunate  in that 
prereform  distribution  was not so egalitarian  to force the pace), but, to 
avoid  social  polarization  in  the  longer  run,  steps  in  this  direction,  as 
well  as liberalizing  labor movement,  will be necessary. 
6. Macroeconomic  Stability  and Sustainability 
As in EE  and the FSU, the movement from planned to market  socialism 
has generated macroeconomic pressures in China. The policy of re- 
source decentralization was more effective than anticipated. Govern- 
ment revenues dropped sharply between 1978  and 1991, and enterprise 
revenues net of subsidies almost vanished (see Fig. 6). This largely re- 
sulted from a sharp decline in the profit rate in the state enterprise 
sector, but it also reflected  the particular  interaction  of ownership, man- 
agement and fiscal arrangements.  Local  governments were the effective 
owners and regulators of many of the enterprises, as well as tax collec- 
tors. This produced a situation fraught with conflicts of interest, moral 
hazard, and collusion against the center. Even though central  develop- 
ment expenditures  were  cut as investment  was  decentralized,  the effect 
was  a heavy  fiscal stress  mirrored in moderate,  but rising,  deficits after 
1985. 
Moreover, revenue and ownership policies interacted, in the form of 
case-by-case bargaining over tax targets fixed in  nominal (not real) 
terms. This had the unintended consequence of rendering fiscal policy 
ineffective as a macroeconomic  regulator. At the same time, decentral- 
ization weakened central monetary control.41  China's reform process 
therefore resulted in demand-led macroeconomic shocks that had an 
impact on a system with limited indexation: Figure 7 shows the close 
relationship between inflation and changes in industrial output symp- 
tomatic of such a demand-pull relationship. 
Declining SOE profits and rising losses reflected several factors. In 
1991  36%  of the losses were concentrated  in extractive  industries whose 
prices were controlled at below-market levels. Industrial profits have 
also felt the effect of contractionary  policies initiated after 1989. A third 
factor is the erosion of the state's production monopoly and generally 
growing competition (see Naughton (1992);  Chen, Jefferson,  and Singh 
41.  For discussions  of China's  monetary  and  fiscal control  methods  and  their shortcom- 
ings,  see  Blejer (1992); Schmidt-Hebbel  (1991); Fan and Woo (1992); and Chen,  Jeffer- 
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Figure 6 FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION 
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(1992); and  Singh,  Xiao, and  Ratha (1993)). This has led to a decline  in 
the  supraprofits  of  state  industry  (previously  used  to concentrate  sur- 
plus  in the  state  sector)  as well  as in the  TVE sector,  where  the  entry 
of hundreds  of  thousands  of  new  rural producers  drove  pretax  profit 
rates down  from 40% in 1978 to about  13% in 1990. In further support 
of the  competition  hypothesis,  Singh,  Xiao, and  Ratha (1993) use  data 
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from 28 provinces  to show  that the more  rapid the growth  of nonstate 
industry  was  during  1985-1990,  the lower  the profit rate of state indus- 
try in 1990. 
A fourth,  less  benign,  factor may  have  been  the  consequence  of in- 
creasing  SOE autonomy  in  the  face  of  unclear  ownership,  leading  to 
owner-retained  earnings  enterprise  decapitalization,  falling profits,  dis- 
tress borrowing,  and macroeconomic  pressure.  Fan and Woo (1992) note 
problematic  symptoms  at the  enterprise  level  very  similar to  those  so 
destabilizing  in the  reform  socialist  phase  in EE and the  FSU: a rise in Can Communist Economies  Transform  Incrementally?  The Experience  of China ? 123 
wage  payments  (and  especially  in  fringe  benefits)  relative  to  output,  a 
"hunger"  for  resources,  and  increasing  recourse  to borrowing  by  enter- 
prises  at  the  expense  of  retained  earnings.42 
So  far,  the  growth  and  pronounced  financial  deepening  of  China's 
economy  has  permitted  credit  to  expand  rapidly  in  real  terms.  To  an 
extent  difficult  to  determine,  this  has,  so  far,  cushioned  losses  in  the 
enterprise  sector.43  How  China  deepens  reforms  in  response  to  the 
weakened  financial  position  of  the  SOEs  will  play  a  critical  role  in  de- 
termining  whether  macro-destabilization  can  be  avoided,  and  the  favor- 
able  macro  environment  for  growth  sustained.  China's  financial 
deepening  will  not  continue  indefinitely.  However,  for  three  reasons, 
the  situation  is  more  favorable  than  in  EE and  the  FSU.  First,  Chinese 
authorities  have  again  begun  actively  to  implement  reform  within  the 
industrial  sector.  These,  indeed,  appear  to  signal  a  change  of  attitude 
toward  enterprise  closures  and  property  rights  issues.4  Second,  the 
rapid  growth  of  China's  economy  raises  its  capacity  to  absorb  losses. 
Third,  with  the  share  of  state  industry  now  accounting  for  less  than 
one  half  of  industrial  output  and  falling  steadily,  growth  is  ever  less 
dependent  on  state  enterprises.45  With  adequate  policies,  China  there- 
fore  appears  to have  the  potential  to escape  the  trap  of macro-instability 
that  has  beset  other  countries  in  the  phase  of  reform  socialism. 
42. For a 300 enterprise  sample  of SOEs studied  by Fan and Woo (1992), nonproductive 
assets  rose from 18% of productive  assets  in 1984 to 24% in 1988, and nonproduction 
expenditure  rose over  twice  as fast as production  costs.  See also Xiao (1990). 
43. McKinnon  (1993)  cites  estimates  of  the  consolidated  government  (and  enterprise) 
deficit that are in the  range of 8% of GDP. 
44. Prices have been  further liberalized.  Layoffs have been enforced in a number of indus- 
tries. The state has begun  an active program of restructuring the coal industry,  sched- 
uling  the reductions  of 100,000 workers  in each year during  1992-1995.  This year, 30 
mines  are scheduled  to be closed  (New York  Times, December  29,  1992, p.  D1). Also, 
ownership  reform is again on the agenda  (see Harrold, 1993). In practice, many enter- 
prises  are selling  shares  to employees,  residents  within  the enterprise  locality,  or on 
the  Shenzhen,  Shanghai,  or  renegade  stock  markets.  More  significantly,  there  are 
powerful  incentives  to bring private capital into the state sector. Strapped for revenue, 
local governments  are selling  participation in many smaller state enterprises  for which 
they  are responsible.  Perhaps  the  most  visible  example  was  the  recent  sale  by  the 
Quanzhou  City government  (Fujian) of a 60% controlling  interest  in 40 of the  City's 
41 state  factories  to a Hong  Kong  company  (Wall Street Journal, January 14, 1993, p. 
A12).  Moreover,  because  joint  ventures  operate  under  favorable arrangements  with 
respect  to  taxes,  flexible  labor-management  relations,  etc.  in  order  to  secure  these 
advantages,  many  enterprises  are actively  seeking  foreign  partners. 
45. In the early 1950s, 90% of Taiwanese  industry  was  state-owned.  Through the growth 
of the nonstate  sector, not through  privatization  of state-owned  enterprises,  this share 
has  now  fallen to a small proportion. 124 ? GELB, JEFFERSON, & SINGH 
7. Conclusions  and Their  Transferability 
Micro-based  evidence  on the impact of China's reforms outside  of agri- 
culture has  only  recently  become  available,  and the next few  years will 
see  an intensification  of studies  in this area. But even  allowing  for data 
weaknesses  and  gaps  in information,  a number  of the questions  raised 
in the introduction  can be addressed. 
7.1 SLOW  VERSUS  RAPID  REFORM? 
"Improving" reforms can be successful  in raising productivity in agricul- 
ture and  industry,  more  in the  nonstate  sector but  also  in state enter- 
prises.46 The  sources  of  productivity  gains  in  China  have  generally 
conformed  to theoretical predictions.  Factor returns have tended  to con- 
verge  with  widening  marketization,  and  the  entry  of  nonstate  enter- 
prises on a large scale has helped  to create domestic  competition.  Flows 
of investment,  trading,  and management  skills,  notably  from the over- 
seas  Chinese  community,  have  complemented  the competition  benefits 
of the  open-door  policy.  Despite  incomplete  market liberalization  and 
reform  of  property  rights,  incentives  in  both  the  state  and  nonstate 
sector  have  pushed  progressively  in  the  direction  of  conformity  with 
market forces. 
China  therefore  suggests  that a "Big Bang" is not necessary  for eco- 
nomic reasons,  unless  addressing  initial macro-imbalances justify it. The 
main elements  of the  "big bangs"  have  been  price and trade liberaliza- 
tion and supporting  fiscal, monetary,  and exchange  rate policies.  Liber- 
alization  was  effected  in  China  over  a number  of years  during  which 
time the structure of the economy  was  able to adapt, including  through 
the  competitive  entry  of  hordes  of  nonstate  firms.  But gradual  price 
liberalization  is not possible  when  prices are freed abruptly at the start 
of the reform, as part of a macroeconomic  stabilization program needed 
as a precondition  for effective  micro-level  reform. 
7.2 DECENTRALIZED  INITIATIVE? 
In certain respects,  a decentralized  "bottom-up"  approach to reform can 
have  advantages.  It encourages  change  by  consensus  and  can  avoid 
possible  costly errors. The most important impact on China's productiv- 
ity  has  always  followed  measures  to  decentralize  decision  making  in 
agriculture,  and  rural and  urban industry.  Success  on  a local basis  of 
experimentation  has  spurred  replication  and  eventual  national  accep- 
46. It is worth recalling that there was much criticism of TVE industry in the 1980s because 
of the competition  it created for state enterprises,  and that a reform strategy based on 
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tance.  Decentralization  has  created  domestic  competition  between  dif- 
ferent  provinces,  regions,  and  localities,  and  for  investment  funds, 
domestic  markets,  and  foreign  investments,  creating  an  economy  of 
many  "small  provincial  dragons"  and innumerable  local "dragonlets." 
Especially  for large countries  like Russia and India,  there are powerful 
positive  lessons. 
On the other hand,  this approach to reform also imposes  costs: dupli- 
cation,  undue  slowness,  less  coherence  in  national  policies,  the  end- 
lessly  negotiated  "guanxi"  nature of China's economic  environment.  A 
bottom-up  approach  is  quite  unsuitable  for certain  aspects  of reform, 
such  as establishing  the needed  instruments  for macromanagement. 
7.3 PROPERTY  RIGHTS  AT THE OUTSET? 
Immediate  privatization  may  not  be  necessary  for successful  reform- 
but diversifying  ownership,  providing  financial incentives,  and encour- 
aging entry are very important.  Much of China's gains have been due to 
"pseudo-privatization,"  of rural land and of rural industry,  to "owners" 
who,  though  not  always  private  and  not  enjoying  all of the  attributes 
of ownership,  have  faced incentives  similar to private owners.  In addi- 
tion  to  the  direct  productivity  gains  in these  sectors,  they  have  made 
possible  the  functioning  of  competitive  domestic  markets  and  exerted 
competitive  pressure  on  state  enterprises,  where  profit-making  incen- 
tives  have  been  introduced  and  management  decentralized  as  partial 
substitutes  for  privatization.  China's  experience  confirms  that  small- 
scale privatization  and the liberalization  of distribution  and service sec- 
tors are likely to have the fastest payoff in the reform of property rights. 
7.4 WELFARE  EFFECTS? 
Growth,  though  necessary,  is unlikely  to solve  the problem  of absolute 
poverty  alone.  After  the  elimination  of  Stalinist  repression  of  agricul- 
ture,  China's  experience  suggests  that  reform  leads  to  a widening  of 
income  distribution  capable of offsetting  even  the effect of high growth. 
The early establishment  of a universal  social safety  net may be prema- 
ture  in  many  reforming  socialist  countries,  but  at  some  stage  this  is 
likely  to become  one  of the critical issues  for China's  reform. 
7.5 IS PERFORMANCE  SUSTAINABLE? 
China's  rapid growth  momentum  cannot  be  sustained  without  deeper 
reforms.  It partly reflects  transitional  factors and initial conditions  that 
temporarily have boosted  performance.  These include  the boost  to agri- 
culture  from  the  introduction  of  the  household  responsibility  system 
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that resulted  from surplus rural factors of production,  and the extremely 
repressed  and  inefficient  condition  of industrial  production  at the start 
of the reforms. Industry has also seen transitory productivity  gains from 
the spread  of marketization,  which  is now  largely complete  outside  the 
state sector. 
These gains from "improving"  reforms have permitted China to move 
closer to its production  potential  at the same time that the potential  has 
grown  through  high  investment  and  technological  upgrading.  In the 
absence  of further reforms,  however,  growth  will slow  down.  The fad- 
ing  of any  gains  from the  demographic  transition  of the  1970s is likely 
to strengthen  this proposition. 
At the  same  time,  there is evidence  that some  of the concerns  raised 
in Eastern Europe and the FSU-such  as the tendency  for an economy 
based  on  autonomous  state  firms  to  generate  persistent  excess  de- 
mand-also  apply  to  China.  Up  till now,  their effect  has  been  muted 
by  the  exceptionally  favorable  growth  record and  unsustainably  rapid 
monetary  deepening.  In this  area,  China can learn from the  problems 
of  other  countries,  and  it will  need  to  look  to  their experience  in  ad- 
dressing  them. 
7.6 WHAT  KINDS  OF DEEPER  REFORMS? 
Further reforms  are needed  by both  the  state and the  nonstate  sector. 
The decline  in profitability of the former threatens  to become  a serious 
drain on the  resources  of the financial system  and,  thus,  ultimately  on 
the  fiscal  system,  destabilizing  the  macroeconomy,  undermining 
growth,  and  reducing  the  ability  to  absorb  losses  in  a vicious  circle. 
State enterprise  cum banking  reform has  become  the  Gordian knot  for 
China,  just  as it has  for the  transforming  countries  of Eastern Europe 
and the  FSU. Whether  or not  this necessarily  will involve  rapid, wide- 
spread,  privatization  in China is a moot  point.  But, to be successful,  it 
will require reorganization  to have  many  of the characteristics of priva- 
tization-including  opening  up  the  state  enterprise  sector  to  foreign 
investment  to facilitate its integration  into world  markets. 
Nonstate  enterprises  have  so far flourished  without  a well-developed 
property  rights  framework,  but  there  are signs  that the  informality  of 
regulation  and  deep  involvement  of local governments  will  become  a 
drag  on  performance  as  firms  become  larger and  more  sophisticated 
and  require  longer-term  investments.47  Macroeconomic  management, 
too,  will  require  stable  and  predictable  tax rules,  rather than  case-by- 
case  tax bargaining.  This would  be a further important  stage  in clearly 
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defining  the  apportionment  of  income,  risk,  and  responsibility-in 
short,  formally defining  property  rights. 
7.7 HOW TRANSFERABLE  ARE  LESSONS  FROM  CHINA? 
Three  distinctive  features  of  China  may  first be  noted:  (a) China  was 
never  so  thoroughly  a  state  enterprise  dominated,  centrally  planned, 
monopolized  economy  as the other,  more developed  communist  coun- 
tries.  This left more  open  the  option  of "growing  out of the plan" and 
facilitated  the  growth  of  competition.  (b) China  started  from  a rather 
balanced  macroeconomic  position,  applied  generally  conservative  mac- 
roeconomic  policies,  and was not subject to large external shocks during 
reform.  This differs from the situation  in Europe and the FSU, particu- 
larly after 1989.  (c) China's  reforms  have  not  been  accompanied  by  a 
fundamental  political  transition.  How  do these  factors bear on the pat- 
tern  of reform? And,  what  has  China  done  that others  have  not,  and 
vice versa? 
China's  policies  and  response  may be compared  with  two  phases  of 
reforms in Europe and the FSU: the pre-1990 movement  to reform social- 
ism  and the post-1990  transitions  to private market economies.  Relative 
to reform  socialism in Europe, China's  reforms  emphasized  decentraliza- 
tion,  stimulating  entry of new  producers,  permitting  domestic  competi- 
tion,  and  opening  the  economy.  This,  in  conjunction  with  a  highly 
conservative  macroeconomic  stance and the less monopolized  condition 
of the economy,  forced enterprises  to confront a "demand  barrier" and 
respond  to  market  pressures.  At the  same  time,  planning  and  a high 
degree  of  government  direction  were  retained  in  certain  parts  of  the 
economy.  European reform socialism denied  new entry, developed  little 
real competition,  and  sustained  less  conservative  macroeconomic  poli- 
cies  while  abandoning  formal planning.  It left agents  constrained  nei- 
ther  by  market  nor  by  plan.  In  contrast,  enterprises  in  China  were 
constrained  by  both,  sometimes  together,  with  essential  favorable  re- 
sults. 
7.8 RELATIVE  TO POSTSOCIALIST  TRANSITION 
China  has  moved  slowly  on  price and  market liberalization.  And  with 
the partial exception  of agriculture, it did not effect a decisive  allocation 
of property  rights to private agents. 
Here, the issue  of political transition becomes  very important. Indeed, 
perhaps  the  most  important  lesson  from China is that political economy, 
rather than simply economic  theories, lies at the heart of the process  of socialist 
transition. It is most  unlikely  that China-style  reform would  be accept- 
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government.  One  reason  is that it leaves  power  and responsibility  (in- 
cluding  a planning  mechanism)  in the hands  of the existing bureaucracy 
for  an  extended  period.  Rapid  privatization  in  Europe  and  the  FSU 
(where  political  changes  preceded  postsocialist  transition)  has  been 
needed  to  create alternative  owners  and  define  property  rights  in  the 
face  of  governments'  abdication  in  these  areas.  It is  no  accident  that 
the more radical privatization  programs have  followed  the more radical 
breaks in the continuity  of governments.48 
The  other  reason  is  that  a  gradual  strategy  requires  effective  state 
management  of  the  transition.  Many  might  agree  that the  state  could 
play  an  important  role  in  guiding  reform  in  the  absence  of  well- 
developed  market institutions.  But how  to frame this role constructively 
becomes  far more  difficult  when  the  state loses  capacity  to enforce  its 
policies.  "Glasnost"  before  "perestroika"  probably dictates  a quite dif- 
ferent model  of fast, minimally  regulated,  and possibly  chaotic,  reform, 
for this reason  alone. 
This question  of whether  or not the state retains the capacity to con- 
trol bears on many  aspects  of the reform process.  Take, e.g.,  the issue 
of price liberalization.  From the purely economic  perspective,  the faster 
prices  are  liberalized  the  better  for  allocative  efficiency.  China  chose 
gradual liberalization  because  of the potential  dislocation  and destabili- 
zation  of moving  rapidly.  A downside  is that the wedge  between  free 
and controlled  prices encourages  corruption and rent-seeking  behavior. 
In China,  the strong  authority  of the state has kept this within  bounds; 
in  much  of  the  FSU,  corruption  has  perhaps  been  the  only  booming 
sector.  Another  factor in the calculus  is that political stability is in gen- 
eral  a  correlate  of  high  growth  and  foreign  investment  inflows.  The 
political  stability maintained  in China has been  an important factor en- 
couraging  the  investment  and  growth  needed  to  effect  huge  changes 
smoothly. 
But "perestroika"  before  "glasnost"  still leaves  open  the large ques- 
tion  of whether  authoritarian government  can coexist  indefinitely  with 
a market economy.  Experience elsewhere  in East Asia offers a model  of 
gradual political reform that ensues  from economic  prosperity.  Indeed, 
the center and party have  lost considerable  control over local economic 
initiative,  population  mobility,  and  information  flows  in  China.  The 
basic  outline  of economic  reform seems  to be irreversible.  But there is 
48.  One  can  imagine  a China-style  reform  being  implemented  in  the  USSR in  the  late 
1980s,  had  controls  succeeded  in  restoring  macro-stability  and  had  the  government 
been  really  committed  to  reform.  Communism  was  externally  imposed  on  Eastern 
Europe,  however,  so  that it is harder to imagine  a government  retaining  legitimacy 
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still a possibility  that a chaotic political transition could  damage  macro- 
stability and the reform environment. 
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Comment 
DWIGHT  H. PERKINS 
Harvard  University 
China's  economy  has been  booming  for most  of the past 14 years since 
reforms  began  in  1978.  Outside  observers  have  frequently  dismissed 
evidence  of a rapid economic  transformation  by describing  it as a flash 
in the  pan.  They  did  this  in the  early  1980s,  and  such  observers  were 
out in force after the Tiananmen  tragedy in June 1989. As this paper by 
Gelb,  Jefferson,  and  Singh  makes  clear,  however,  it is the  periods  of 
slow  growth  that  have  been  the  aberration,  not  the  periods  of  high 
performance.  I  shall  return  later  to  the  issue  of  whether  this  high- 
growth  performance  is likely  to continue. 
I shall begin,  however,  by underlining  my basic agreement  with  the 
thrust of the Gelb, Jefferson,  and Singh essay,  although  I shall do so in 
my own  words.  First, as their essay  indicates,  the Chinese  reforms were 
more bottom  up  and  spontaneous  than they  were  a product  of a well- 
thought-out  central plan  designed  using  the  latest  economy  theory  of 
how  a market economy  should  be structured.  Second,  all of the careful 
econometric  work to date,  much  of it done  by the authors of this essay, 
indicates  that total factor productivity  growth  has been  substantial even 
in  the  much  maligned  state-owned  industrial  enterprises.  The  really 
high  performers,  however,  were  the  small-  and  medium-scale  enter- 
prises  under  the jurisdiction  of townships  and villages. 
It is  also  clear,  as  the  paper  indicates,  that  there  are fundamental 
differences  between  the economic  reforms in China and those in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union.  The initial conditions  were funda- 
mentally  different.  China had a functioning,  relatively strong authoritar- 
ian government.  East Europe  and  Russia,  with  some  exceptions,  have 
completely  new  political systems  with  little capacity to implement  gov- 
ernment  economic  functions,  including  such  basic  functions  as  the 
ability  to  collect  taxes.  People  mostly  prefer  these  latter,  much  more 
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democratic  systems,  but that should  not blind one to the fact that weak 
governments  may  not  be  ideal  if one's  primary  focus  is  on  economic 
reform.  Second,  China's  economy  was  and is dominated  by small-scale 
units,  not  only  in agriculture  and  services,  but also in industry,  where 
half of gross  output  is produced  outside  the  state  sector.  East Europe 
and Russia are dominated  by huge  plants,  often with monopoly  powers, 
that  reflect  the  Stalinist  fascination  with  "gigantomania."  It is  much 
easier to get small units  to respond  appropriately  to market forces than 
large ones. 
East Europe and Russia have  attempted  to carry out the transition to 
a  market  economy  in  a very  brief  period-the  "big-bang"  approach. 
But  Poland  and  Russia,  at  least,  began  with  something  approaching 
hyperinflation,  and a do-it-all-at-once  approach is usually  the best way 
to end hyperinflation.  East Europe and Russia also had political revolu- 
tions,  and  rapid  privatization  schemes  can  probably  be  justified  as  a 
means of consolidating  the political revolution,  whatever  their economic 
impact  might  be.  China,  of  course,  had  neither  hyperinflation  nor  a 
political revolution.  China's  principal reform need  was a whole  new  set 
of  institutions  and  the  trained  and  experienced  people  to  run  them. 
Anyone  who  believes  that  such  institutions  can be  created  quickly  or 
can learn to function  efficiently  in a span  of a few  years has never  had 
any  institution-building  experience.  Institution  building  is inevitably  a 
gradual process  unless  one  defines  institutions  as being  pieces  of paper 
with  laws  written  on them. 
Finally,  almost  everyone  agrees  that China's  economic  performance 
since reforms began  has outstripped  that of Eastern Europe and Russia. 
The  differences  in  GNP  growth  rates,  however,  mask  the  fact  that 
China's  economy  never  required  the  same  degree  of  restructuring  as 
that of,  say,  Russia.  China  overemphasized  steel  and  machinery  prior 
to  1978, but China's  military expenditures  were  never  a large share of 
GNP.  The  reasons  why  this  was  so  would  take us  far away  from the 
concerns  of a macroeconomic  conference.  The significance in contempo- 
rary terms is that China needs  to further expand  its steel  industry,  not 
close  down  half of its capacity,  as may be the case in Russia. 
But what  about the future? Will China's  high  economic  performance 
be increasingly  hampered  by the  partially reformed  nature of its econ- 
omy  as Gelb, Jefferson,  and  Singh  suggest?  I shall deal with  only  one 
aspect  of  this  issue,  the  question  of  how  China's  partially  reformed 
economy  affects its macroeconomic  performance. 
There are fundamental  differences  between  how  monetary  and fiscal 
policy work in a market economy  and how  they operate in a Soviet-style 
system  of central planning  such as existed  in China before 1978 and still Comment  .  135 
exists  in certain respects  today.  In a market economy,  to state the obvi- 
ous  to a conference  of macroeconomists,  the sequence  of causal effects 
begins  with  high-powered  money  that combines  with  certain banking 
rules  (reserve  requirements,  etc.)  to  determine  the  money  multiplier 
and  the  potential  supply  of money  (M2). The actual money  supply  re- 
sults  from the  interaction  of this  potential  supply  with  enterprise  and 
individual  demand  for  credit.  Allocation  of  credit  to  recipients  is  ra- 
tioned by the interest rate in a pure market system  or some combination 
of the interest  rate and other forms of credit rationing in the real world. 
Schematically,  this process  is as follows, 
high-powered  money  supply  demand  for 
money  -  multiplier  -  of  -  credit 
(M2)  credit 
Macro  economic  policy  in  this  kind  of  system  operates  directly  on 
high-powered  money  or, through  open  market operations  and the like, 
on  the  money  multiplier.  The  supply  and  demand  for credit and  the 
allocation  of  credit among  users  is  not  controlled  directly by  the  gov- 
ernment. 
The Soviet-style  system  adopted  by China works  in the opposite  di- 
rection.  Macroeconomic  policy  begins  by  determining  the  level  of  in- 
vestment  and  then  allocating  it among  the various  potential  users.  The 
banking  system  then  allocates  the  funds  needed  to  make  this  invest- 
ment possible.  The money  supply,  in essence,  results from these invest- 
ment  decisions  interacting with  such things  as individuals  need  to hold 
cash  balances.  The  banking  system  accommodates  whatever  the  plan 
requires. The main role of branch banks is simply to monitor compliance 
with  the  plan.  Branch banks  are in turn an integral part of the central 
bank,  and  the  central bank  simply  prints whatever  money  is required 
subject to rules that are not enforced  if they interfere with  this require- 
ment.  Schematically,  this is, 
enterprise  branch bank  central bank 
demand  for  -  supply  of  -  accommodation 
credit  credit  of branch bank 
N\  /  needs 
central investment  plan 
In the first stage  of reform,  China changed  the form of this system,  but 
the  substance  remained  very  much  intact.  Specifically,  branch  banks 
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The People's  Bank became  a central bank,  not  a combined  commercial 
and central bank. Enterprises were no longer governed  by central plans 
and no longer  got investment  funds  from the government  budget,  and 
when  they  borrowed  these  funds  from the banks,  they were  supposed 
to pay  them  back with  interest.  Planners  no longer  told investors  how 
much  to invest  nor did they  tell the banking  system  how  much  to lend 
(most  of the time). 
But the  reality  was  that  the  direction  of  causation  still started  with 
enterprise  investment  demand,  and  the  banking  system  basically  ac- 
commodated  this  demand.  Because  enterprises  were  only  partially 
reformed,  they  still had considerable  "investment  hunger,"  to use Kor- 
nai's  term.  Sympathetic  politicians  ensured  that  the  banks  would  re- 
spond  and interest  rates were  low in any case,  plus the banks had little 
power  with  which  to insist  on repayment.  The share of nonperforming 
loans  in the commercial  banks' portfolios  is unknown  but huge. 
In  this  partially  reformed  system,  the  application  of  standard  ap- 
proaches  to  monetary  policy  could  control  inflation  by  reducing  the 
money  supply,  thereby  cutting  off  credit  to  enterprises.  Tight  credit, 
however,  would  lead to a scramble for funds  for projects good  and bad 
that  would  be  settled  on  the  basis  of  the  relative  political  strength  of 
the various  protagonists.  When  China faced  the need  to control credit 
in  1988 and  1989 because  of rising  inflation,  it chose  to do  so  directly 
rather than indirectly through  central bank operators. Basically commer- 
cial banks were  told to cut back lending  by a certain amount  across the 
board. The policy did bring down  inflation,  but by early 1990 it had also 
brought  growth  to  a halt.  Shortly  thereafter,  credit was  loosened  and 
growth  restarted. 
How  does  one  complete  this reform process?  The goal is straightfor- 
ward.  One  wants  to reverse  the direction  of causation  and get the vari- 
ous  components  to  operate  in  accordance  with  market  principles.  In 
practice,  this  means  changes  at both  ends  of the  spectrum  and  in the 
middle.  A partial list would  include: 
1.  clarifying enterprise  property rights so as to reduce or eliminate man- 
agement  objectives  that lead to investment  hunger. 
2.  allowing  commercial  banks  to  charge  substantial  positive  real rates 
of interest  and give  them  powers  to enforce  loan repayment. 
3.  reforming  accounting  rules and their enforcement  so that it is possi- 
ble to measure  accurately  enterprise  and bank profits and losses. 
4.  establishing  enforceable  rules  for such  basic things  as bank reserve 
requirements. 
5.  enhancing  the power  of the central bank so that it has the authority 
in reality,  not just on paper,  to regulate  the supply  of money. Comment  137 
What will happen  if these  and other related measures  are not under- 
taken? The growth  rate will  no  doubt  remain fairly high  because  there 
are  too  many  East  Asian-style  underlying  elements  that  will  keep  it 
going.  But growth  is likely to have a stop-go  character to it. Investment 
hunger  accommodated  by the banking  system  will  lead  to inflationary 
pressures  that will threaten  to get out of hand.  To stop inflation,  credit 
brakes will be applied,  and  growth  will  slow  or halt. The employment 
implications  of  slow  growth  will  be  politically  unsustainable,  and  the 
credit brakes will be released  and  growth  will  accelerate again.  With a 
reformed  banking  system,  in contrast,  the  government  should  be able 
to  control  inflationary  pressures  with  less  impact  on  the  growth  rate. 
Cycles  will  continue  to  exist,  but  periods  between  downturns  should 
be  longer,  and  the  degree  of  downturn  required  to  control  inflation 
would  be less. 
Comment* 
JEFFREY  D. SACHS 
Harvard University 
The paper  by Gelb,  Jefferson,  and  Singh  offers a wide-ranging  survey 
of recent  research  on  China's  economic  reforms  since  1978. The well- 
informed  discussion  and  extensive  bibliography  will  be  useful  to  all 
students  of the Chinese  economy  and of economic  reform policies  more 
generally.  The paper also aims to draw lessons  from China for Eastern 
Europe.  Many  differences  between  the  regions,  however,  make  facile 
comparisons  unhelpful  and  indeed  misleading.  My  main  complaint, 
however,  is with  respect  to the discussion  on China itself,  where  I find 
Gelb,  Jefferson,  and  Singh  to  be  insufficiently  hardheaded  about  the 
weaknesses  of China's  reforms with  regard to property  rights. 
China is a communist,  one-party  state groping  toward a market econ- 
omy.  The  reforms  proceed  fitfully  and  often  inconsistently  in the face 
of  contradictory  economic,  political,  and  ideological  pressures.  Gelb, 
Jefferson, and Singh tend to make a virtue of each zig and zag,  celebrat- 
ing  the  inevitable  "experimentation"  that  China's  conditions  yield, 
rather than  pointing  out the costs  of holding  onto  socialist  dogma.  On 
the basis of a few years of rapid GNP growth,  the authors are too ready 
to undervalue  our vast accumulated  theoretical and practical knowledge 
concerning  the  importance  of  private  property  rights  and  legal  infra- 
structure. If lessons  are to be learned,  I have little doubt that the lessons 
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will  continue  to  flow  to  China  from  the  market  economies,  including 
the fast reformers of Eastern Europe such as Poland,  rather than in the 
other direction. 
1. Historical  Background 
My  philosophical  differences  with  the  authors  begin  with  their  first 
paragraph.  They write,  "Reform of a communist  country is considered 
here  as  shifting  away  from  central  planning  toward  largely  market- 
based  resource  allocation.  It also involves  strengthening  incentives  that 
link material reward  to economic  performance  by moving  toward  pri- 
vate  ownership  and  reforming  management  incentives  within  systems 
that  maintain  extensive  social  ownership."  I  doubt  that  the  implicit 
choice  in the  second  sentence  is real. I believe  that China,  like Russia 
and  Eastern  Europe,  is  on  its  way  to  private  ownership,  or  at  least 
should  be.  For complex  historical  reasons,  both  Russia  and  China  are 
100 years  behind  the  transition  made  in Western  Europe and Japan in 
establishing  the modern  institutions  of private property. 
As  is increasingly  appreciated,  modern  capitalism  and  modern  eco- 
nomic growth emerged  in Western Europe in large measure as the result 
of key institutional  and political innovations  that established  clear prop- 
erty rights and a separation  of the state from commercial and industrial 
activities  (see  North  and Thomas,  1973, for a canonical treatment).  The 
wave  of  reforms  between  1750 and  1870 included  the  following:  the 
abolition  of  servile  obligations  and  other  feudal  remnants  throughout 
Europe; the  codification  of  commercial  and  civil law; the  introduction 
of modern  company  law; and the institution  of a modern  fiscal system, 
in which  statutory  tax obligations  replaced  tax farming,  the  "squeeze" 
of local bureaucrats,  payment  in kind rather than money,  arbitrary con- 
fiscations,  and  tax exemptions  of the  nobility.  While  these  liberalizing 
reforms evolved  gradually  in the United  Kingdom,  they  were  imposed 
from above  in  many  other  countries,  as the  result  of war,  revolution, 
or enlightened  authoritarian rule. 
Capitalistic modernization  made  only  partial inroads  in 19th-century 
Russia.  Key  aspects  of  the  modernization  agenda  were  frustrated  for 
decades  by the reactionary grip of the nobility  and the Tzar. A modern 
company  law  was  never  adopted  (see  Owen,  1991). The emancipation 
of the serfs was  deformed  from the start, because  collective village own- 
ership  rather  than  individual  ownership  was  replacing  serfdom  (see 
Gershenkron,  1962; Blum,  1978; Pipes,  1974; Ulam,  1981). And  a com- 
mercial code  was  never  adopted  before  1917 (Owen,  1991). 
In  Asia,  Japan  and  China  diverged  in  their  response  to  the  same 
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went  abroad to  search  for international  best  practices,  while  in China 
each  attempt  at reform (such  as the abortive  100 Day's  reform of 1900) 
was  at least  partially  frustrated  by  the  weakness  and  reaction  of  the 
Manchu  regime,  as well  as the  deeply  entrenched  interests  of China's 
vast officialdom  at the local and regional level.  Fairbank (1992, pp.  180- 
181) has summarized  the conclusions  of generations  of scholars: 
In short, capitalism  failed to prosper in China because the merchant  was never 
able to become established outside the control of the landlord gentry and their 
representatives  in the bureaucracy.  In feudal Europe  the merchant  class devel- 
oped in the towns. Since the landed ruling class were settled in their manors 
upon the land, the European  towns could grow up outside the feudal system 
instead of being integrated  in it. Medieval  burghers  gained their independence 
by having a separate habitat in these new towns, and new political authority 
to protect them, in the persons of the kings of nation-states. In China, these 
conditions were lacking. The early abolition of feudalism and the dependence 
of the emperor and his officials upon the local gentry left no political power 
outside the established order to which the merchant  could turn for special pro- 
tection  ....  Between  them,  the gentry and officials saw to it that the merchants 
remained under control and contributed  to their coffers instead of setting up a 
separate economy. 
In both  Russia  and  China,  we  are now  witnessing  the  best  chance 
in  decades  for unwinding  the  failures  of  19th-century  modernization, 
although  in  both  countries  the  process  remains  fraught  with  political 
risks.  In both  countries,  foreign  and civil wars were  followed  by brutal 
dictatorships  that  championed  economically  disastrous  theories  until 
the past decade.  (Of course,  Eastern Europe's socialism was a retrogres- 
sion  imposed  by  the  Red  Army  during  1945-1989).  After  decades  of 
economic  debacle,  the long-delayed  incorporation  of "international best 
practices" is once  again  on the agenda.  But after 135 years of debating 
whether  peasants  should  own  land  in  Russia,  or whether  local  mer- 
chants  in China  should  be free from local bureaucrats,  it is a little silly 
to talk about  "rapid" versus  "slow"  privatization. 
2. China's  Reforms  Since  1978 
The  Chinese  reforms  that  began  in  1978 mercifully  ended  one  of  the 
most brutal and misguided  economic  regimes  in modern  history.  While 
the  authors  speak  of "erratic economic  performance  and  demographic 
changes"  (p.  3)  following  the  Great  Leap  Forward  and  the  Cultural 
Revolution,  a different  phrase  comes  to  mind  for a manmade  famine 
that killed millions  during  1959-1961,  and for state-promoted  social up- 
heaval  that destroyed  the lives  of millions,  including  almost  the whole 140  SACHS 
intellectual  class,  while  paralyzing  rural development  for more  than  a 
decade  between  1966 and  1978. 
By 1978, China was  in a situation  reminiscent  of Russia in 1921 after 
three  disastrous  years  of  War Communism.  (For a  discussion  of  the 
New  Economic  Policy  [NEP],  see  Ball, 1987.) And  like  Lenin  and  the 
NEP, Deng  led a pragmatic policy of marketization and controlled liber- 
alization  under  Communist  leadership.1  Both the  NEP and  Deng's  re- 
forms led to a rapid recovery  from the earlier devastation,  and to years 
of sustained  growth,  but with continued  restrictions on private property 
rights.  The  absence  of  property  rights  facilitated  Stalin's  subsequent 
reversal of the NEP (although  he  still eventually  required mass  murder 
to  succeed).  The lack of clarity in China's  property  rights remains  the 
greatest  risk to the Chinese  economy. 
Nonetheless,  China's prospects  are vastly brighter than Russia's dur- 
ing  the  NEP  for  one  reason.  The  international  dimension  of  China's 
reforms-including  freer trade,  foreign  investment,  and  foreign  man- 
agement-provides  a powerful  impetus  to  the  continued  adoption  of 
"best international  practices" in China's  economic  organization.  In the 
new  "global village"  today,  the cross-country  flow  of institutional  best 
practices  proceeds  far more  rapidly  than in the  1920s. No  single  econ- 
omy  in the world  dares espouse  autarky as a development  strategy. 
There  have  been  three  major aspects  to  China's  reforms.  The  first, 
and perhaps  most  important,  was  the partial liberalization of the coun- 
tryside.  Because  no less  than  75% of the labor force worked  in agricul- 
ture as of 1978 (compared  with  20% in Poland in 1989, and around  13% 
in  Russia  in  1991),  this  was  a  critical and  highly  successful  step.  As 
Gelb, Jefferson,  and Singh note,  the rural reform was quite radical, and 
had "somewhat  of a 'big bang' character." (p. 5). The second reform was 
the international  opening  of parts of the economy,  particularly along the 
coast.  These  reforms included  partial convertibility,  trade liberalization, 
and  the  attraction  of  foreign  direct  investment,  mostly  from  offshore 
Chinese  investors.  The third part of the reform was  an attempt  to im- 
prove  the  performance  of  state-owned  enterprises  by  granting  them 
more  autonomy.  This,  as  Gelb,  Jefferson,  and  Singh  note,  has  been 
"gradual  and  piecemeal."  Fortunately  for  China,  the  employment  in 
the  state  industrial  enterprises  is  only  around  8% of  the  labor  force 
(about 40 million  workers  out of 500 million). 
1. The basic precepts of the policies were similar:  marketization  of peasant agriculture, 
replacement  of forced  requisitions  of agricultural  output by a fixed monetary  tax, social- 
ized ownership of large industries; partial marketization  of industrial  relations. The 
main distinction  between the NEP and Deng's reforms  lies in the international  sphere, 
with China's  important-perhaps decisive-reliance  on international  trade  and invest- 
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And  what  of the results? The radical liberalization of the countryside 
has produced  dramatic results: the rapid development  of township  and 
village enterprises  (TVEs) as well  as improved  agricultural productivity. 
The opening  of the economy  has produced  a boom in trade to the West, 
based  heavily  on low  wages,  and Hong  Kong capital and management. 
The effects of the reforms of the state-owned  enterprises  have been poor 
to fair. Their productivity  performance,  not surprisingly,  is consistently 
below  those  of private  or TVE enterprises.  And  they  make  enormous 
losses,  at a heavy  cost to the budget.  Chinese  officials estimate  that two 
thirds of the state enterprises  are now loss making,  at an annual budget- 
ary cost of some  $15-20  billion.2 The losses  would  be even  larger were 
account taken of the cheap credits administratively  directed toward this 
sector,  as Woo  emphasizes  (1993). 
3. Continuing  Problems  in China's  Reforms 
Despite  the  enormous  economic  progress  under  the  reforms,  and  the 
intoxicating  GDP growth rates of the past two years, it is much too early 
to proclaim victory  of China's  reforms.  Political and economic  liberties 
are not  protected;  property  rights  are not  clearly established,  regional 
disparities  threaten  national  unity,  and  there  are no  settled  arrange- 
ments  linking  the central and regional governments.  The recent growth 
of output  and living  standards  is heartening  but hardly conclusive  with 
regard to China's  future. 
In a way,  the Chinese  debate is further along than the paper by Gelb, 
Jefferson, and Singh would  suggest.  Many Chinese  specialists  are much 
less  impressed  with  the  state  enterprises  than  their Western  counter- 
parts.  They  also  worry  aloud  about  the  limitations  of  the  TVEs and 
whether  their institutional  forms are really adequate for continued  rapid 
growth.  They stress the continuing  waste  of resources implied by politi- 
cal intervention,  heavy  subsidization  of  state  enterprises,  the  absence 
of  discipline  via  bankruptcy,  the  lackluster  management,  and  the  ab- 
sence  of  clear  ownership  rights.  Therefore,  the  debate  has  advanced 
rapidly  to corporatization  and  even  privatization  (especially  via public 
offerings  of shares)  of the  state firms. 
Consider  first the  situation  in the  countryside,  where  the  news  has 
seemingly  been  unreservedly  positive.  First, much of the direct produc- 
tivity  gain  in  agriculture  had  the  character of  a one-time  adjustment 
2. The official statistics suggest  one third of enterprises  are operating at a loss, but officials 
widely  concede  that one  third is a huge  underestimate.  As reported in the China Daily 
(January 26,  1993, reported  in Woo,  1993, p.  16), "At present,  about  one-third  of the 
state firms are definitely  operating  at a loss and another one-third  suffer hidden  losses, 
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after  two  decades  of  turmoil.  Per  capita  grain  production  peaked  in 
1984, after jumping  in the early 1980s (CIA, 1992). Consistent  with this, 
the  evidence  suggests  a considerable  slowdown  in overall TFP growth 
in  agriculture  after a spurt  in  the  first half  of  1984, with  TFP growth 
falling from 9.52% per year during  the  1980-1984,  compared  with  just 
2.60% per  year  during  1984-1988  (Harrold,  1992, Table 3).  It may  be 
even  lower  if attention  is restricted to grain production. 
Moreover,  the boom  in TVE employment  has  also waned,  although 
TVE growth  has  continued.  According  to Chen  (1993), employment  in 
TVEs rose  by  12.6  million  persons  per  year  during  1984-1988,  while 
during  1988-1991  TVE growth  per annum  was  just  210,000.  As  Chen 
stresses, 
Due to the absence of vacancies  in town and village enterprises  for three consec- 
utive years, 27.30 million new laborers  from a total increase of 30.26 million, 
were forced to find work in the fields, thus increasing the agricultural  labor 
force by 8.7%, further  burdening the already crowded farm land, aggravating 
the problem of rural unemployment and holding back the rate of increase in 
farmers'  income. 
One result has been a serious  widening  of income inequalities  in China, 
with  the  incomes  of  the  rural poor  falling  relative  to  the  urban labor 
force.  In 1978, the ratio of rural to urban incomes  was  2.36,  one  of the 
highest  ratios in the world.  By 1984, this ratio had declined  to 1.86 after 
the  first wave  of rural reforms.  By 1990, the income  gap had  widened 
again,  to 2.42,  above  the base  ratio of 1978. The situation  deteriorated 
further in 1992, with  the rise of the ratio to an estimated  2.6. 
These  problems  are  almost  surely  related  to  limitations  in  China's 
rural reforms.  The TVE collective  ownership  structure puts an effective 
limit on scale, because  efficient  management  of large-scale collectives  is 
difficult,  and because  TVEs lack access  to an equity  market. Moreover, 
the intertwining  of local politicians and TVEs recalls the lack of indepen- 
dence  of  the  merchant  class  in  the  last century,  with  all its  attendant 
risks.  It also  fuels  regional  protectionism,  in which  local governments 
adopt  mercantilism  policies  against  other  Chinese  regions  in  order to 
bolster  the  profits  of their TVEs. In farming,  the absence  of land  titles 
remains a significant  problem for peasant  cultivators,  in decreasing  mo- 
bility,  mortgaging  of land,  and security  for long-term  improvements  in 
infrastructure.  Perhaps  even  more  remarkable,  and  crippling,  are the 
continued  restrictions  on residential  mobility,  between  the countryside 
and  city,  and  within  regions  in  the  countryside.  As  Chen  points  out, 
".  ..  lack of  institutional  support  for the  free  flow  of rural labor has 
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and dispersed.  This state of dispersion  and isolation  hinders  absorption 
of  excess  rural labor,  which  in  turn  holds  back  increases  in  farmers' 
income." 
These restrictions  recall servile limitations  that were eliminated  in the 
West a century  or more ago. 
The problems  in the state enterprise  sector are better known.  Produc- 
tivity growth  in the  state sector has been  much  lower  than in the non- 
state  sector,  although  how  much  lower  remains  a  point  of  active 
dispute,  partly because  of concern  over the price deflators used  for the 
productivity  comparisons.  While the state enterprise  sector has contin- 
ued  to  grow  in  the  1980s,  this  is  surely  in  large  part because  of  the 
enormous  financial resources  thrown  at the  sector.  The growth  indica- 
tors  say  little about  the  allocative  efficiency  of the  investments.  There 
is  no  dispute,  however,  that  subsidies  to  the  state  enterprises  have 
been  a continuing  source  of macroeconomic  destabilization,  with  total 
budgetary  subsidies  in 1990 totalling  no  less  than  106 billion  yuan  out 
of total budget  outlays  of 309.3 billion yuan (Yeh, 1992). As Yeh summa- 
rizes: 
While total factor  productivity  of state enterprises  with independent accounting 
grew at 6.1 percent per year during 1978-84, it fell to  -4.2  percent between 
1984 and 1987. The number of enterprises in debt increased from 41,000 to 
60,000, and their losses rose from 3.4 to 11.6 billion yuan over the same period. 
According to an SSB official as recently as early 1992, conditions have not 
changed, and poor managerial  and operational  quality of the enterprises still 
contribute to low efficiency. As may be expected, given the soft budget con- 
straint, the enterprise managers are under no pressure to operate efficiently. 
(p. 530) 
As with  the problems  of the countryside,  the crisis in the state enter- 
prises  will  be  resolved  only  upon  widespread  privatization.  (See  also 
Fan and Woo,  1992.) 
4. Comparisons  of China  and Eastern  Europe 
Are  there  lessons  here  for Eastern  Europe  and  Russia? Some  obvious 
ones  come  to mind:  Small business  development  can proceed  rapidly, 
even  in  a poor  country  and  after decades  of  repression;  international 
trade can grow rapidly on the basis of low wages  and imported  technol- 
ogies;  and  macroeconomic  destabilization  can  provoke  social  unrest 
with  harsh  consequences,  as occurred  in China  in  1989. But these  are 
not special  Chinese  lessons.  After a few years of reforms in Poland,  we 
see the same dynamism  in the private sector and in international  trade. 
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approximately  1 per 12 members  of the labor force! The Polish  private- 
sector  growth  is  probably  outstripping  TVE growth  and  with  much 
sounder  long-term  ownership  characteristics.  In three years,  the Polish 
private  sector  has  risen  from  around  20% of  overall  GDP and  25% of 
total employment,  to around  55% of both GDP and employment. 
Similarly,  hard-currency  earnings  have  also  grown  rapidly,  and 
against widespread  expectations  that Poland's exports would  be too low 
quality  to penetrate  industrial  country  markets.  Poland's  international 
market opening  began  in 1987, when  Poland,  like China,  introduced  a 
system  of retention  rights  for foreign  exchange  earnings.  In 1990, Po- 
land moved  to full convertibility  of the currency on the current account, 
while  China  has  not  yet  done  so.  The results  have  been  a striking in- 
crease  in exports,  rising  from about  $8 billion  in  1988 to $14 billion  in 
1992, about  the  same  proportionate  increase  that China experienced  in 
its  first years  of  trade  opening.  The  export  growth  has  been  matched 
by  a  surge  of  interest  in  foreign  direct  investment  as  well,  again  in 
parallel  to  China's  experience.  In 1992, Poland  received  commitments 
for $4 billion  of new  capital inflows,  and the trend is accelerating,  and 
this  despite  the  absence  of 50 million  offshore  Chinese  in Hong  Kong 
and other parts of East Asia. 
Unfortunately,  China  offers  few  positive  lessons  about  the  state  in- 
dustrial  sector.  While  China  had  about  8% of  its  labor force  in  state 
industrial  enterprises  at  the  start of  reforms,  Poland  and  Russia  had 
around  40% in the  sector.  And  given  the  large weight  of these  enter- 
prises  in the economy,  neither  Poland  nor Russia could  afford to carry 
losses  in  two  thirds  of  these  enterprises  year  after year,  as  China  is 
doing. 
What about a purported  lesson  concerning  gradualism  versus  "shock 
therapy."  Wasn't  there  more  "pain"  in  the  Eastern  European  case, 
which  was  avoided  in China? Here I think that superficial comparisons 
are very dangerous,  for two reasons: The conditions  in the two regions, 
both  economic  and  political,  are vastly  different;  and  casual  compari- 
sons  also  seriously  misconstrue  what  is underway  in Eastern Europe. 
Let us consider initial conditions.  As we have already noted,  in China, 
three  fourths  of  the  population  was  in  peasant  agriculture.  Thus,  the 
radical reforms in the rural area constituted  a radical reform for the bulk 
of the economy.  Thus, it is wrong  to describe China's reforms as gradual 
in this area. And  it is silly,  of course,  to advocate  an "agriculture first" 
policy  in Eastern Europe or the FSU, because  in Poland  the agriculture 
was  already  private  (but  to  little  avail  for the  economy  as  a whole!), 
because  full-time  agricultural labor was  perhaps  only  15% of the labor 
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economy.  In Russia,  the  proportion  of workers  in  agriculture  in  1991 
was  only  13%. 
Second,  Poland  and  Russia  faced  an extreme  macroeconomic  crisis, 
including  extreme shortages,  a monetary overhang,  a huge  foreign debt, 
a  large  budget  deficit,  and  an  incipient  hyperinflation-all  of  which 
fortunately  China did not have.  Thus, there was urgent need  for stabili- 
zation  at the  very  start of  the  reform  program.  In turn,  this  required 
extensive  price  decontrols,  international  liberalization,  and  extensive 
cuts in budgetary  subsidies. 
As for results,  comparisons  of China and Eastern Europe and Russia 
are  hampered  by  timing  and  misinterpretation.  China  has  been  re- 
forming  since  1978; the bulk of Poland's  reforms started in 1989. While 
we  could  all  agree  that  Chinese  reforms  were  vastly  superior  to  the 
pre-1989 reforms  in  Eastern Europe  and  the  FSU,  the  real question  is 
post-1989. 
Gelb,  Jefferson,  and  Singh  bemoan  the  "precipitous  fall in  output" 
(p. 1), or even  "chaotic" reform (p. 27), of Eastern Europe. But contrary 
to widespread  misunderstanding,  there is simply no evidence  of a sharp 
drop in living  standards  in Eastern Europe.  The output  cutbacks came 
in areas in which  industry  was  vastly  overextended  (e.g.,  steel produc- 
tion) so that the cutbacks actually freed resources  and raised living stan- 
dards,  rather than lowering  them  as in a conventional  recession.  As of 
1992,  industrial  production  was  rising  rapidly  in  Poland  but  now  in 
new  areas  geared  toward  consumers  (e.g.,  apparel,  food  processing, 
furniture) rather than the old heavy  industrial  sectors. 
According  to studies  of household  consumption  spending,  real con- 
sumption  barely changed  in Poland in 1990 compared with 1989, despite 
a tough  year  of  stabilization.  In fact,  living  standards  may  well  have 
increased,  when  one  considers  the  elimination  of  queues  and  the  in- 
creased  variety  and quality  of consumer  goods  (see  Roberts,  1992, and 
Sachs,  1993). Table 1 shows,  e.g.,  the veritable boom in household  own- 
ership  of consumer  durables  after just two years  of radical reform. 
Finally,  with  respect  to unemployment,  we  can't even  venture  a real 
comparison.  In Poland,  measured  unemployment  reached  13.6% of the 
labor force  in  1992 and  has  apparently  leveled  off.  Most  Polish  labor 
economists  believe  that about  one  third of the  unemployed  have  jobs 
in the  second  economy.  Moreover,  and  surprisingly,  most  of Poland's 
high unemployment  is in the countryside,  because  unemployment  rates 
in the  urban areas are generally  around  5% (with  the  single  exception 
of Lodz,  a high-unemployment  textile town).  In China, unemployment 
and  underemployment  in the  vast  countryside  continue  to be  hidden 
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not register for unemployment  benefits.  I have already drawn attention 
to  the  restrictions  on  physical  mobility  and  choice  of  residence  that 
continue  to lock the  hundreds  of millions  of peasants  to the land.  The 
social costs  of this policy are hidden  (indeed,  Gelb, Jefferson, and Singh 
do not even  mention  this shocking  denial of basic liberty), but not negli- 
gible.  Income  inequalities  are on  the  rise,  and  hidden  unemployment 
in the countryside  numbers in the tens of millions.  In this regard, clearly 
the  question  of "dislocation  and  destabilization"  (p.  28) are in the eye 
of the beholder. 
5. Politics  and Speed  of Reform 
Gelb, Jefferson,  and Singh  are correct to stress in their conclusions  that 
the nature of reform is intimately  connected  with  the political process. 
I do not,  however,  fully subscribe to their specific vision  of this linkage. 
In their view,  Chinese  gradualism  was  a way  to escape  destabilization, 
while  in  Eastern  Europe  there  was  no  other  choice  but  the  state  had 
lost  its  capacity  to  act.  While  this  is  true,  I would  still  put  the  issue 
differently.  In Eastern Europe,  the burst of political freedom  after 1989 
made  possible  a dramatic break with  the past and a surge toward  "best 
practice" institutions  of Western Europe. The faster the better, and poli- 
tics supported  a fast move.  In China,  with  a regime  still committed  to 
socialism  although  with  "Chinese  characters," groping  was  inevitable, 
even  if costly.  In Russia,  a third situation  arises.  The politics  has been 
Table 1  END-OF-YEAR  STOCKS  OF CONSUMER 
DURABLES  PER  100 HOUSEHOLDS 
(WORKERS'  HOUSEHOLDS) 
1988  1991 
Radio  88.9  91.1 
Of which are stereo  22.6  38.9 
Portable  radio  68.7  58.6 
Color TV  41.7  82.9 
Video player  1.9  41.0 
Tape recorder  68.8  81.5 
Of which are stereo  20.6  46.0 
Bike  93.2  93.3 
Car  30.2  38.3 
Automatic  washing machine  55.5  67.2 
Refrigerator  100.0  99.9 
Freezer  16.4  27.4 
Vacuum  cleaner  96.2  97.6 
Sewing  machine  60.7  59.6 
Of which  are electric  43.7  47.0 
Source:  GUS,  Survey  of Workers' Households,  1992. Comment ? 147 
turbulent  for almost  two  years.  There is less  possibility  of reform from 
the  top  as in China,  because  the  "top" is a wide  plateau  rather than a 
peak. At the same time, the battles rage between  reformers in the execu- 
tive branch and hardliners in anachronistic  institutions  such as the Peo- 
ple's Congress,  which  was  selected  in 1990 under the one-party  system. 
In these  circumstances,  key reforms and macroeconomic  stabilization in 
Russia  may  continue  to flounder  until  there is a more complete  break- 
through  to democratization  as in Eastern Europe. 
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Discussion 
Olivier Blanchard asked  for a clarification of the role of the rural town- 
ship  and  village  enterprises  (TVEs). Are TVEs a transitory  step  along 
the way  to the eventual  reform of property rights,  or do they constitute 
a political  barrier to  this  reform? Singh  responded  that  the  TVEs are 
precisely  the sort of "open  door" through which  private property rights 
can eventually  enter.  Previously,  there was  an old idea that if you  tied 
the  fast-growing  Hong  Kong  to  the  giant  wheel  of  China,  somehow 
Hong  Kong  would  be  destroyed.  Instead,  the  giant  wheel  of  China 
seems  to be  turning  with  the  small Hong  Kong.  The introduction  of a 
more open-trade  policy and the management  practices and contacts that 
evolve  through  joint  ventures  are forcing  the  Chinese  government  to 
reform not  only  property  rights but also factor and product  pricing. 
Bob Hall remarked that the central property issue  is whether  an indi- 
vidual's  interest in the TVE for his or her county is a marketable interest. 
Without  such  a market,  he  suggested,  there will be a fundamental  fail- 
ure  of  the  property  rights  even  though  the  TVEs are operating  more 
and  more  as  conglomerates,  especially  with  restrictions  on  migration 
between  villages. 
Bob Gordon  wondered  if it is  unambiguously  bad  for a country  to 
control  migration  out  of the  rural sector  to cities.  The Latin-American 
experience  suggests  that  unrestricted  migration  leads  to  cities  sur- 
rounded  by  slums  as the  capacity  of the local economy  to absorb new 
people  is exhausted.  The question  is whether  it is better to have hidden 
unemployment  in  the  city  or  in  the  rural  agricultural  areas.  Singh 
echoed  these  concerns.  The lack of labor mobility clearly generates  eco- 
nomic inefficiency  because  there is no asset trading. However,  from the 
point  of view  of those  sitting  in Beijing,  the  alternative  is to have  the 
120 million  "wandering  workers"  relocate to the cities.  The scale of the 
problem  is enormous. 
Bob Gordon  also wondered  how  China was  able to continue  its huge 
subsidies  of the  state-owned  enterprises  while  avoiding  high  inflation. 
In contrast,  the  situation  in Eastern Europe prior to 1990 and in Russia 
currently  is  one  of  hyperinflation,  because  the  subsidization  of  state- 
owned  industry  requires the creation of money  to pay the wage  bills. 
Andrew  Atkeson  attempted  to  juxtapose  the  recent  experiences  of 
China and Eastern Europe,  generating  a discussion  that nicely  summa- 
rizes a key tension  addressed  in the paper and in the Comments.  Com- 
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the large decline  in output  in Eastern Europe since reform yields  a fun- 
damental  question.  How  did China achieve  such  extraordinary growth 
while  Eastern  Europe  was  saddled  with  large  output  losses?  Did  the 
Eastern Europeans  do something  wrong,  or was there something  funda- 
mentally  different  about the two  situations? 
Sachs  responded  that it is important  not  to equate  measured  output 
with  changes  in welfare.  Pointing  to the table in his  Comment,  he  re- 
marked  that between  1988 and  1991,  the  so-called  "great depression" 
in  Poland,  ownership  of  consumer  durables  increased  dramatically. 
Similarly,  household  expenditure  surveys  suggest  that there was  very 
little  decline  in  nondurable  consumption.  The  idea  that  there  was  a 
drop  in  living  standards  is  incorrect.  Heavy  industry  was  recklessly 
overemphasized  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  Poland  for 60 and  40 years, 
respectively,  the  result  being  that  in  1990 the  Soviet  Union  produced 
160 million  metric tons  of steel,  while  the United  States produced  only 
80.  Because  PPP-adjusted  GNP  is  eight  times  higher  in  the  United 
States,  the steel intensity  per dollar of GNP was  sixteen  times higher in 
the  Soviet  Union  than  in  the  United  States.  After  reform  in  such  a 
situation,  the market says very loudly,  "Pizzerias,  not steel mills." Dur- 
ing  the  period  of  supposed  decline  of  output,  1.6  million  businesses 
started  in  Poland.  This  is  not  a  recession,  Sachs  indicated;  this  is  a 
structural transformation  away  from coal mines  and  steel  mills toward 
a tertiary sector. 